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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AND CROSS PETITIONER

Plaintiff-Petitioner
and Cross-Respondent
V.

Case No. 910218
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS,
Court of Appeals No. 870276
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross-Petitioner

Category No. 13

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before this court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals to review certain aspects of its decision in State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah
ADD.),

cert, granted. _ P - 2 d _ (Utah, 1993). This court has jurisdiction over this case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-3(a) (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case originated as an appeal of right to the Utah Court of Appeals from a
final judgement of conviction for the offense of Possession of Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab
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County, the Honorable George E. Ballif, judge presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals
reversed the judgement and conviction and ordered a new trial.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
The following issues, raised by petitioner, were granted review by this court:
1.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the roadblock stop of

respondent violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, as it was not
authorized by statute?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the voluntary consent

to the search of respondent's vehicle was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
roadblock stop?
The following issue was raised in the cross petition for certiorari as granted by
this court:
Does Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution permit law enforcement
officers to make a seizure without an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
All issues accepted for review by this court in this case involve questions of
law. The court reviews such questions for correctness, State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d
1256 (Utah 1993).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
The rights of the people to be secure in their
persons,houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The respondent was charged by information with the offense of Possession of
a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a violation of Utah Code Annotated
§58-37-8(1 )(a)(i) (1953 as amended). (R.7). Prior to trial, respondent made a motion
to suppress the evidence. He alleged that evidence was seized in violation of Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution. Both prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. (R. 1 1 , 22-57). That
motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. (R. 104-112 Tr. 1-67). Respondent
requested that the trial court reconsider its ruling as that court had not specifically
addressed the issues raised in relating to the Utah Constitution. (R. 113) That motion
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was also denied. (R. 121-122). Respondent waived his right to trial by jury and the
case was tried to the court based upon stipulated facts. Those facts included the
evidence admitted at the hearing on the motion to suppress hearing. (R. 116-117).
Respondent was convicted as charged in the information. The indeterminate prison
sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation. (R. 148).
In the Court of Appeals, the state did not brief the roadblock issue. Originally,
the state's only argument in that court was that any illegality in the roadblock was
vitiated by respondent's voluntary consent. In its supplemental brief, the state took
the position that the case ought to be remanded to the trial court in light of the rulings
in State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1990), (regarding attenuation of a voluntary
consent) and Michigan Department of Public Safety v. Sitz. 496 U.S. 444 (1990),
(regarding the fourth amendment standards for a roadblock). The Court of Appeals
rejected the state's request and ruled that the roadblock violated the fourth
amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. That court also found
that there was insufficient attenuation between the roadblock stop and the voluntary
consent. Consequently, the evidence seized subsequent to the consent was ordered
to be suppressed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On Wednesday, July 27, 1988, Utah Highway Patrol Troopers and deputy
sheriffs from Utah and Juab County conducted a roadblock on Interstate 15 in Juab
County.

(Tr. 6, 48)

The roadblock had multiple purposes. It was conducted to
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detect criminal, motor vehicle registration, equipment and driver's license violations.
(Tr. 6, 24, 50). The roadblock was located between mile posts 220 and 222 on
Interstate 15, about 2 miles south of Nephi, Utah. (Tr. 6, 20). It was conducted
under the supervision of Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol. (Tr.
46-48). Sergeant Mangelson had received verbal permission to conduct the roadblock
from his immediate superior Lieutenant James Utley. No evidence was introduced by
the State to indicate any reason for the selection of that particular time, date or
location.
Notice that this roadblock would be conducted was announced in the "Juab
County Times News." That was published about two to four weeks prior to July 27,
1988.

(Tr. 7. 33). A patrolman assigned to the roadblock testified that he was

unsure if that particular newspaper was distributed outside of Juab County. (Tr. 34)
Interstate 15 is the primary north-south highway in Utah and is also the primary route
of motor vehicle travel from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles, California. (Tr. 34) There
was no indication that the "Juab County Times News" would be available to the
majority of the people who would be the subjects of the roadblock.
Motorists driving on the interstate were given notice of the roadblock by three
signs. (Tr. 7, 49, 56-57). Those signs were about four feet square, orange in color
with black lettering. (Tr. 49) The first sign was placed within one-half mile of the
roadblock (Tr. 56) and pictured a silhouette of a flagmen. (Tr. 49. 56) The second
sign was about two hundred yards from the roadblock (Tr. 56) and read "Prepare to
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Stop" Tr. 49, 57). The last sign was right at the roadblock (Tr. 56) and read "All
Vehicles Must Stop." (Tr. 49-57) Sergeant Mangelson testified that all of these signs
were similar to signs used at road construction zones (Tr. 55). None of the signs
indicated that motorists were to be detained by law enforcement agents at a
roadblock. (Tr. 56) The speed limit in this areas is posted at 65 miles per hour. (Tr.
21) A motorist travelling at or around the speed limit would be given less than onehalf minute of notice before being stopped and detained.
After the third sign, cones were set in the roadway directing the traffic to the
right. (Tr. 49) About ten officers were in position to receive the vehicles. (Tr 49)
Sergeant Mangelson gave verbal instructions to each of the officers as they arrived.
(Tr. 22, 57) Mangelson testified that he had never received any written memorandum
or policies for conducting roadblocks from either the Utah Highway Patrol or the State
Department of Public Safety.

(Tr. 61-62)

In describing the only instructions he

received, Sergeant Mangelson testified "I was told the signs met the regulation." (Tr.
62) No regulation was ever introduced into evidence.
Sergeant Mangelson also testified that he instructed the officers manning the
roadblock that they were to look for driver's license, liquor and drug violations. (Tr.
58) He also told them not to stop any large trucks. (Tr. 58). Initially, the officers
were to inspect drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. If the officers noticed
anything that they may consider to be unusual they had the discretion to have the
driver pull over so that further investigation could be conducted. (Tr. 58-59) Trooper
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Carl Howard, who worked at this roadblock testified that if he noticed a problem while
inspecting the registration and driver's license it was within his discretion to determine
if a motorist should be further detained or allowed to leave. (Tr. 28) The trooper also
indicated it was within his discretion to determine what investigative procedures could
be taken. (Tr. 28) Officers had the discretion to interview the motorists, radio the
dispatcher to run a warrants or stolen vehicle check, or request to search the vehicle
(Tr. 25-30).
At about 9:00 a.m. on July 27, 1988, respondent was stopped at the
roadblock. (Tr. 8) Other than the roadblock, the troopers had no articulable suspicion
or probable cause that respondent was involved in the commission of any crime. (Tr.
31-32) Trooper Howard initially contacted respondent and requested to inspect his
driver's license and registration.

(Tr. 9)

Respondent produced a Georgia State

driver's license and vehicle registration that indicated he resided in Utah. (Tr. 9) At
the time, trooper Howard detected an odor of alcohol inside the vehicle and on
respondent's breath. (Tr. 9) Trooper Howard also noticed an open bottle of liquor on
the rear seat. (Tr. 9) The trooper asked respondent about the odor of alcohol and
respondent indicated that he had not been drinking that morning, but had been
drinking the previous night. (Tr. 10) Trooper Howard requested that the respondent
and the passenger, Dorsey Thompson, exit the vehicle. (Tr. 11) They complied with
this request.

The trooper then requested permission to search the vehicle and
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respondent acquiesced. (Tr. 11) Trooper Howard searched the driver's side of the
vehicle and Mangelson searched the passenger side. (Tr. 11-12, 51)
During the search of the ashtray located in the rear passenger side door of the
vehicle, Mangelson discovered remants of marijuana cigarettes.

(Tr. 13, 39, 51)

Trooper Howard then instructed respondent to open the trunk of the vehicle and
respondent complied. (Tr,. 13) Numerous items were removed. A briefcase and
suitcase were opened and searched. Relatively small bags of marijuana were located
in those containers. (Tr. 14, 53) Trooper Howard had previously requested that
respondent perform field sobriety tests. Those tests were conducted as Mangelson
searched the trunk of respondent's vehicle. (Tr. 14, 40-41, 52).
During those tests respondent requested that Mangelson stop searching the
vehicle. (Tr. 4 1 , 54) Mangelson responded, stating that based on the discovery of
the marijuana in the ashtray, he had probable cause to search the entire vehicle. (Tr.
42, 60) Eventually, Mangelson located a package in the spare tire compartment of
the trunk. The package was in a plastic sack and covered with wrapping paper. On
the outside, the word "Toyota" was written in large letters. The package was found
to contain approximately one kilogram of cocaine.

(Tr. 52)

Respondent and

Thompson were then arrested and booked into the Juab County jail. (Tr. 17).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The stop of respondent at the Juab County roadblock violated his right to be
free from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in Article
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I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

The officers lacked an individualized

suspicion that respondent had committed a criminal offense. Furthermore, the officers
had no statutory authority to conduct a roadblock.
The evidence seized subsequent to respondent's voluntary consent to the
search of his vehicle was closely related in time to the initial illegal roadblock stop.
There were no intervening circumstances between the stop at the roadblock and the
consent.

Finally, the roadblock was a flagrant and purposeful constitutional

violation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE
VIOLATED ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
The Court of Appeals concluded the stop of respondent at the roadblock
violated both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article l f
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. State v. Sims, supra. The state has not
requested that this court review the fourth amendment issue. The state constitutional
question has two issues. The first is that raised by cross petitioner: whether Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires a showing of individualized suspicion
before a search or seizure may be conducted? That issue was raised in both the trial
court and Court of Appeals. However, it was not addressed by the Court of Appeals.
The second relates to the State's requested review of the Court of Appeals' ruling:
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whether law enforcement officers need express statutory authority to conduct a
roadblock?
A.
The Broader Protections Provided Under Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution and Should be Determined Prior
to Addressing Fourth Amendment Issues.
Two cases from this court have held that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution provides broader protections than the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution. In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the court held
that Article I, Section 14 precludes the warrantless inspection of a vehicle
identification number.

In emergency situations probable cause and exigent

circumstances would be required to be shown in lieu of a warrant. The court also
held, " . . . this court will continue to use the concept of expectation of privacy as a
suitable threshold criteria for determining whether Article I, Section 14 is applicable
" 794 P.2d at 469.
In State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the court emphasized the
expectation of privacy protected by Article I, Section 14. The court specifically held
that individuals have a privacy interest in bank records. This was a privacy interest
that the Supreme Court held was not protected by the fourth amendment. United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

In Thompson the attorney general had

obtained an investigative subpoena pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1 et. sea.
(1953 as amended). The court noted that the subpoenas in question had previously
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been found to be unconstitutional. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah
1988).
The state contended in Thompson that the evidence seized should not be
suppressed because its agents had acted in good faith in obtaining the bank records.
The state relied upon United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), as authority for
that position. This argument was rejected because the representatives of the attorney
general's office had not relied upon a determination by a magistrate. Nor had they
relied upon the legislature's inadvertent abridgement of a constitutional right in a
statute.
The members of this court were severely divided on the issue of the
applicability of Article I, Section 14 to roadblocks in Sims v. State Tax Commission,
841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992). That case involved the same stop and roadblock as the
instant case. The critical question in that case was whether the exclusionary rule
applied to the state illegal drug stamp tax proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-19-101 e L s e ^ (1953 as amended). Justices Durham and Zimmerman held that
the roadblock violated Article I, Section 14. That was because the stop was made
with neither individualized suspicion nor express legislative authorization. Justices
Hall and Howe dissented in the result. They felt it was unnecessary to address the
issue of the constitutionality of the roadblock as the case could be decided on the
question of the application of the exclusionary rule to tax stamp proceedings. Justice
Stewart concurred in the ultimate result and took the position that the Utah
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Constitutional issue need not be reached because the roadblock issue could be
decided on fourth amendment grounds.
Justice Stewart's opinion raised the question of whether a state constitutional
issue should be decided before or after the court decides a federal constitutional issue.
For historical and practical reasons the state constitutional issue should be decided
first. From the historical perspective, the federal bill of rights was adopted after state
constitutions had enacted bills of rights.

The bill of rights in the Utah State

Constitution is modeled after other state constitutions rather than the federal
constitution amendments.1 Only after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
were the federal bill of rights applicable to the states. Specifically, the federal fourth
amendment protections were not applicable to the states until the decision in Mapp
v- Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). From the historical perspective, the state constitutions
have been the primary source for the protection of individual liberties. There is a
historic justification in this court adopting a procedure where state constitutional
issues are decided prior to decisions being rendered on federal constitutional grounds.
Several practical considerations also justify such a procedure. First, this is a
case that involved actions and decisions by state police agencies. There was no
federal law enforcement involvement. The actions of state police officers should be

1

Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government, The History of Utah's
Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 3 1 1 .
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governed by state rather then federal law whenever practical. Second, there is a need
for finality in litigation, especially in criminal cases. Decisions based solely on state
constitutional grounds are not reviewable by the United States Supreme Court.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). A decision by this court based solely on
independent state constitutional grounds would be final. Finally, such a procedure
furthers the policy of avoiding the resolution of a case on federal constitutional
grounds if there is another basis for a decision.

In Spector Motor Service v.

McLaughlin. 423 U.S. 101 (1944), the Supreme Court indicated that it should not
decide issues of federal constitutional law until after the statutory and state
constitutional claims are resolved.
B.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution Requires
Individualized Suspicion to Justify a Search or Seizure.
When a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock, there is no probable cause or other
individualized suspicion that the occupants are engaged in any wrongdoing. Courts
that have upheld the use of roadblocks have done so on the theory that the
individual's fourth amendment interests need to be balanced against society's interest
in efficient enforcement of the law. 2 In doing so, the procedures employed at the
roadblock must include strict limitations on the discretion of the officers who man the
roadblock. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz. supra. This argument was

2

See: Point I.D.
13

rejected by Justices Zimmerman and Durham in Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra.
The legal basis for their position was that in State v. Larocco. supra, the court held
that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution required probable cause to stop or
search a vehicle. Such individualized suspicion is not present at a roadblock.
Other courts have rejected the reasoning that the Supreme Court applied in Sitz.
In Pimentel v. Department of Transportation. 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989), the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that a roadblock established specifically to apprehend
drunk drivers violated that state's constitution. The court acknowledged the need to
apprehend and punish those who commit crimes. The court also noted that the Rhode
Island constitution and statues required individualized suspicion that a crime had been
committed before a stop could be made. The state contended that the needs of law
enforcement should be balanced against the constitutional violation. In balancing
these interests, the court stated,

. . . it would shock and offend the framers of the
Rhode Island Constitution if we were to hold that the
guarantees against unreasonable and warrantless searches
and seizures should be subordinated to the interest of
efficient law enforcement. Once this barrier is breached in
the interest of apprehending drivers who violate sobriety
laws, the tide of law enforcement interest could overwhelm
the right to privacy. We decline to take the step of
approving roadblocks, even for the purpose of
apprehending drunk drivers.
561 A2.d at 1352.
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The state in Pimentel also contended that roadblocks deter crimes and that the
guidelines of the roadblock program provided sufficient limits on the officers'
discretion. With respect to the deterrence argument, the court stated,
Even assuming that roadblocks may have some
deterrent effect, we believe that it is purchased at too high
a price. Doubtless other devices may also increase the
effectiveness of law enforcement, including punishment
without trial, repealing of the privilege against selfincrimination, dispensing with the right to confrontation of
witnesses, and elimination of trial by jury.
Such
techniques, however, would diminish the rights of all in
order to secure the punishment of a few.
Id at 1352. The court also rejected the position that limits on officers' discretion
justified the intrusion of the roadblock. In doing so the court held,
Nevertheless no control of discretion can justify roadblock
seizures under Rhode Island law because they are
conducted totally in the absence of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that a motor-vehicle violation had
occurred.
Whereas other states supporting the
constitutionality of roadblock programs may find the drunkdriving problem outweighs the privacy interest of
individuals, the Rhode Island Constitution grants greater
protection and requires the our citizens be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures of this nature.
Id at 1353.
Other courts have also rejected the reasoning for the holding in Sitz and
required individualized suspicion before a vehicle may be stopped. That was the
position taken by the supreme courts of Idaho, Oregon and Louisiana.

State v.

Henderson. 114 Ida. 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (Ida. 1988); State v. Bovanovsky. 304 Or
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131, 743P.2d711 (Or 1987): and State v. Church. 538 So.2d 993 (La. 1989). The
appellate court in Michigan also its state constitution requires individualized suspicion
for a roadblock stop. That court went on to hold that roadblocks violate the Michigan
constitution, Sitz v. Department of State Police. 485 NW.2d 135 (Mich. App. 1992).
That was the same case in which the Supreme Court held that roadblocks conducted
under limited circumstances did not violate the fourth amendment.3
In this case, Trooper Howard testified that the only reason for the stop of
appellant's vehicle was the roadblock. The trooper candidly admitted that prior to the
stop there was no probable cause to believe that appellant was engaged in any
criminal conduct. Likewise, the trooper also admitted that prior to the stop he could
not articulate any facts or circumstances to indicate that appellant was involved in
any criminal conduct. For this reason, the stop of appellant's vehicle violated Article
I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
C.
A Stop Conducted Without Authority of Law Violates
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
The majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals in the instant case ruled that
the lack of statutory authority to conduct a roadblock constituted a violation of
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Sims, supra. That position
was also taken by Justices Durham and Zimmerman in Sims v. State Tax Commission,

3

Michiaan Department of Public Safety v. Sitz, supra.
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supra. The state contends that this position is erroneous. That contention is based
on the argument that a lack of statutory authority may render a police act to be illegal
but not unconstitutional. The state's position is that the judiciary rather than the
legislature sets constitutional limitations on police actions.

The state's position

disregards the need to place legal limitations on the actions of the executive branch
of government. It also disregards the nature and purpose of Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution with respect to limitations on police powers. Finally, the state's
position disregards the interrelationship of the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine and Article I, Section 14.
This court has held that the basic purpose of Article I, Section 14 is to protect
privacy interests. State v. Larocco. supra; State v. Thompson, supra. The method
that is provided to protect these privacy interests is to limit police authority to
conduct searches and seizures. The limitations that Article I, Section 14 places on
law enforcement is to require that searches or seizures be made pursuant to a
warrant. State v. Larocco, supra. That requirement interposes a prior review of the
probable cause required for a search or seizure by the judiciary. Article I. Section 14
also requires that the police actions be reasonable.
There are two ways to analyze the requirement for legislative authorization
under Article I, Section 14. The first focuses on the warrant requirement. Under that
theory, the legislative authorization may be analogous to the judicial authorization
necessary to obtain a warrant. The second theory focuses on the reasonableness
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provision of Article I, Section 14. That theory essentially engrafts the constitutional
separation of powers doctrine onto Article I, Section 14. The essence of that theory
is that a search conducted without legal authority should be regarded as
unreasonable.

1.
The Warrant Requirement
The first type of analysis focusing on the warrant requirement was employed
by the Court of Appeals in the instant case, State v. Sims, supra. The court held that
police officers themselves should not determine if a roadblock should be employed.
The position that the court took was that the determination to allow such stops
should be made independent of the executive branch of the government. The court
then found that the decision of the legislature in authorizing roadblock stops was
analogous to the decision that a judge makes in issuing a search warrant.
summarizing its position, the court of appeals stated,
We believe that legislative authorization of ports of
entry and fish and game checkpoints, like the issuance of
a judicial warrant, triggers at least some presumption that
these law enforcement practices are constitutionally
permissible. Because the roadblock in this case had neither
form of authorization, it was entitled to no such
presumption. Both warrants and statutes originate outside
the executive branch, serving to check abuses of that
branch's law enforcement power. Consistent with our
supreme court's emphasis on the warrant requirement,
then, we hold that suspicionless, investigatory motor
vehicle roadblocks, conducted without
legislative
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In

authorization, are per se unconstitutional under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
808 P.2dat 149.
The state's criticism of this holding does not relate to the need for the decision
to allow suspicionless stops to come from outside the executive branch of
government. Rather, the state focuses on the lower court's analogy of the legislative
process to the judicial function. The state then contends that the court of appeals'
position is wrong because there is a substantial difference between the executive and
legislative branches of government.4
The state does not address the problem of allowing the executive branch
determine the nature extent of its own powers. Rather, the state contends that the
power to conduct roadblocks should be implied from broad statutory authorizations
of police powers. Further, the state also asserts that certain police procedures are
currently employed without specific statutory authorization. With respect to implying
police powers, the statutes that would potentially authorize roadblocks both require
that an officer have at least a reasonable suspicion to stop.5 As previously noted,
there is no individualized suspicion in a roadblock stop.

4

Brief of Petitioner at pp. 7-9.

5

Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1-17(c) and 77-7-15 (1953 as amended).
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The state contends that inventory searches6 and searches incident to arrest7
are not authorized by statute and do not require individualized suspicion or a warrant.
However, in Hvgh the court required "reasonable and proper justification" to conduct
an inventory search. That justification must be either based on statutory authorization
or the circumstances of the vehicle stop. In other words, an individualized suspicion
is required. A search incident to arrest requires probable cause to arrest. State v.
Banks, supra. Furthermore, the power to arrest is authorized by statute. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-7-1 et. seq. (1953 as amended). The state's claim that inventory searches
and seizures incident to arrest are not authorized by statute and do not require
individualized suspicion is wrong.
In Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra, Justices Durham and Zimmerman also
focused on the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 14 in finding that statutory
authorization for a roadblock was required. In doing so, it was noted,
"The requirement that a disinterested party review and
approve the need to search was designed to prevent
arbitrary and oppressive interference with individual privacy
and personal security and to guarantee that a decision to
search private property is justified by a reasonable
governmental interest."
841 P.2d at 9. The state's only response to this policy is that it does not reflect the
views of a majority of the court. Clearly, the warrant requirement of Article I, Section

6

State vHvah. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah, 1985).

7

State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986).
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14 of the Utah Constitution justifies a requirement that specific statutory authorization
is necessary to conduct a roadblock.
2.
The Reasonableness Requirement
The provision of Article I, Section 14 requiring that searches or seizures be
reasonable may also justify a requirement that a roadblock have express statutory
authorization.

Under such an analysis the separation of powers doctrine is

incorporated into the Article I, Section 14 limitations on the authority of law
enforcement.

With respect to the criminal law, the separation of powers doctrine

requires that the laws to be enforced be established by the legislature. The legislature
cannot delegate that authority to the executive branch of the government. In State
v. Gallion. 572 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977), this court held that the legislature could not
delegate to the attorney general the power to decide what drugs should be designated
to be controlled substances.8
The legislature also gives the executive branch the power to investigate criminal
offenses. Unless the police action involves some exigent circumstance these statutes
generally interpose judicial approval of the investigatory action. See generally: Utah
Code Ann. § 77-1a-1 et. sea. (1953 as amended) (Peace officer designation); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-1 eLsefli (1953 as amended) (Authority to arrest); Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-22-1 e t sea. (1953 as amended) (Subpoena Powers for Aid of Criminal
8

See: Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4 and 8 (1953 as amended).
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Investigation);

Utah Code Ann. § 77-22a-1 £L sea. (1953 as amended)

(Administrative Subpoenas in Controlled Substances Investigations); Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-23-1 et. seq. (1953 as amended) (Search and Administrative warrants); Utah
Code Ann, § 77-23a-1 et. seq. (1953 as amended): (Interception of Communications):
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-1 (1953 as amended) (Enforcement of motor vehicle
requirements).
In State v. Thompson, supra, this court indicated that law enforcement officers
cannot claim to have acted in good faith when a search or seizure is conducted
without prior judicial authorization or in execution of a statutory regulatory scheme.9
In other words, such police actions would be unreasonable. The lack of statutory
authority to conduct a roadblock made the actions of the officers involved in this case
unreasonable. To allow law enforcement officers to act without statutory or judicial
authorization is a very dangerous precedent. It would make the only check on the
authority of the executive branch an after the fact judicial review.

The legal

authorization for the particular police action in question would not be a subject of that
review. That fails to meet the requirements of the doctrine of separation of powers
under our constitutional framework. Consequently, a lack of statutory authorization
for police actions makes such actions unreasonable and violates Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution.

See: United States v. Leon, supra.
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Several state courts have specifically addressed the need for statutory authority
to enable law enforcement agents to conduct a roadblock. The Supreme Court of
Oregon addressed this issue in the context of a civil suit for damages by a plaintiff
who was stopped at a roadblock. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692
(Or. 1987). Two other criminal cases involving similar roadblocks were addressed by
that court at that time: State v. Bovanovskv. supra, and State v. Anderson. 304 Or.
139, 743 P.2d 715 (Or. 1987). In Nelson v. Lane County, supra, the state sought
to uphold the use of a roadblock on the basis that such a seizure was constitutionally
authorized.
In Nelson, the state maintained that it had statutory authority to conduct a
roadblock under a general statute that gave law enforcement agencies the authority
to enforce the criminal law. The state claimed that the statue implicitly authorized
roadblocks and that the roadblock in question was conducted in accordance with "The
Oregon State Police Patrol Manual." In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned,
By and large, agencies of the executive branch are free to
carry out their assigned responsibilities in ways of their
own choosing. Making explicit the manner in which any
agency is to accomplish its tasks falls to the agency head
or that official's designee to instruct or sub-delegate to
subordinated officials.
However, some procedures may invade the personal
freedoms protected from government interference by the
constitution. Roadblocks are seizures of the person,
possibly to be followed by a search of the person or the
person's effects. For this reason, the authority to conduct
roadblocks cannot be implied. Before they search or seize,
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executive agencies must have explicit authority from
outside the executive branch.
743 P.2d at 695.
Similarly, in State v. Henderson, supra, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that
its constitutional provision prohibiting warrantless and unreasonable searches and
seizures required express legislative authority to conduct a roadblock. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals found roadblocks to be unreasonable based on the
Oklahoma Constitution. A basis for the court's decision was that officers lacked
statutory authority to make such stops. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1984).
In Utah there is no express statutory authority allowing law enforcement agents to
conduct a roadblock.10

The use of a roadblock was unlawful and therefore

unreasonable under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
D.
The Use of a Balancing Test to Determine Article I, Section
14 Issues Should be Rejected.
The state has cited several cases that hold that express statutory authority is
not necessary for law enforcement officers to conduct a roadblock. People v. Estrada.
68 III. App. 3d 272, 386 N.E. 2.d 128 cert, denied 444 U.S. 968 (1979); Davis v.
Kansas Department of Revenue. 843 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1992); Orr v. People. 803 P.2d

10

Davis and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety
Roadblock Stops in Utah. 3 B.Y.U. I. of Pub. Law 557 (1989), also concludes that
there is no legal authority in Utah to conduct roadblock stops. A roadblock, the
authors further conclude, would be unconstitutional.
24

509 (Colo. 1992); Inoersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987). These cases
generally take the position that a legislative grant of authority to enforce the law
carries with it an implicit authorization to enforce the law in a reasonable manner.
They go on to hold that roadblocks are a reasonable method of law enforcement.
Prior to reaching that conclusion, the court in each of these jurisdictions had
held that the use of roadblocks did not violate the state's constitution. The reasoning
used to reach that conclusion was based on a balancing test similar to that employed
in Michigan Department of Public Safety v. Sitz. supra. Under that test, the court
would balance the intrusion into the rights protected by the state's search and seizure
provisions against the legitimate needs for law enforcement. In doing so, the focus
of the constitutional analysis is on the "reasonableness" provision rather than the
"warrant" requirement of the particular state constitution.
When engaging in this analysis, these courts emphasize that a roadblock
involves a minimal intrusion into personal rights, while there is a great need for society
to prevent offenses such as drunk driving11 and to enforce safety equipment
regulations.12

These cases give little or no significance to the fact that it is a

constitutional right that is being weighed against a need of law enforcement.
Furthermore, since these constitutional challenges arise in the context of a criminal
proceeding, when the interests are balanced, law enforcement needs will generally

11

lnaersol v. Palmer, supra.

12

Peoole v. Estrada, supra.
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prevail.13

Because the intrusion caused by a roadblock is minimal, secondary

conclusion to this analysis is that there is no need for express statutory authorization
to address this public problem.

People v. Estrada, supra; Orr v. People, supra;

Inaersoll v. Palmer, supra.
There are a number of problems created when this type of balancing test is
employed. The primary problem is that in order to engage in the analysis there must
first be a constitutional violation.

By balancing that violation against society's

interest, the courts are simply legitimizing the constitutional violation. The courts then
become a party to the violation by allowing evidence seized as a result of that
violation to be used in court. Furthermore, if law enforcement agents are aware that
they need only be able to claim that a novel, but unlawful, enforcement technique can
be balanced against societal interests, then there will be little to deter officers from
engaging in that activity. These are the same problems that the court recognized in
State v. Arrovo. supra, that justified application of the exclusionary rule. These same
policies should preclude this court from engaging in a balancing test to resolve Article
I, Section 14 issues.
The final problem with utilizing this balancing test is that it allows the warrant
and probable cause requirements to be read out of Article I, Section 14. That effect
was recognized by this court in State v. Larocco. supra. In that case the court opted

13

Evidence of a crime will be suppressed, and a person who has committed a
criminal offense will go free if the balance does not weigh in favor of the state.
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to follow what Justice Durham has described as the "warrant approach" to Article I,
Section 14 analysis.14 In employing that analysis, an officer must have a warrant
to make a stop or arrest. If it is not possible to obtain a warrant, the court indicated
that probable cause and exigent circumstances must be present. By engaging in this
analysis, Justices Durham and Zimmerman refused to find that the authority to
conduct a suspicionless roadblock stop could be implied from general statutory
directives to enforce the vehicle code. Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra.
In the instant case, the officers who manned the roadblock indicated it was
established for a number of purposes. Those purposes included enforcement of the
provisions at the Motor Vehicle Code, Criminal Code, and Controlled Substances Act.
The legal authority to conduct suspicionless stops for such general law enforcement
purposes cannot be implied. Without such authority, the roadblock in this case was
conducted without authority of law.

A stop without legal authority violates the

warrant and reasonableness requirements of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
E.
The Utah Constitutional Issue Should be Addressed and the
Court Should Find that Roadblock Stops Violate Article I,
Section 14.
This case presents two important issues with respect to the application of
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The first relates whether this court will
u

Sims v. State Tax Commissioner, supra, at 8.
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address state constitutional questions prior to deciding an issue based on the federal
constitution. Clearly, the roadblock issue in this case could, and has been decided,
on a fourth amendment basis. However, history and public policy should require that
this court address the state constitutional issues relating to the roadblock.
Should this court address the state constitutional issues, a primary concern will
be whether the analysis involves a balancing test. If the court rejects that test, the
state must show that there was both individualized suspicion that respondent
committed a crime and legal authority to conduct the roadblock. On the other hand,
employing a balancing test would allow the court to follow the federal-type precedent.
This would require that the court abandon the analysis that led to the conclusion in
Larocco and effectively eliminate the warrant requirements of Article I, Section 14.
A test that balances law enforcement interests against constitutional violations should
be rejected. This court should find that the roadblock stop of respondent violated
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
POINT II
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK STOP AND THE VOLUNTARY
CONSENT TO SEARCH TO ALLOW THE EVIDENCE SEIZED
TO BE ADMISSIBLE.
The state contends that the holding in Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra.
is at odds or inconsistent with State v. Thurman. supra.

Both of those cases

addressed issue of the admissibility of evidence seized subsequent to a voluntary
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consent which followed an illegal search. In State v. Arrovo. supra, this court held
that in such a situation the consent must not only be voluntary, but that consent must
be sufficiently attenuated form the initial illegality to dissipate the taint from that
illegality.

It is this attenuation analysis that the state claims to be the basis of

inconsistent holdings. A review of the development of the law on this issue and a
comparison of the facts of Thurman and the instant case will demonstrate that there
are no inconsistences in the holdings.
The attenuation issue was first addressed by the Court of Appeals in State v.
Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988).

The court held that the only test to

determine the admissibility of evidence seized when a consent followed an illegal stop
was the voluntariness of the consent. As authority for that conclusion, the court
relied on United States v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141 (1 Oth Cir.), cert, denied. 479 U.S.
914 (1986).

In State v. Arrovo. supra, this court rejected that analysis. The court

reasoned that not addressing an attenuation analysis" . . . failed to give proper weight
to fourth Amendment values" 796 P.2d at 689. The court also noted that such a rule
also failed to provide adequate deterrence to law enforcement officers. It allowed
officers " . . to ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the
illegality has occurred." 796 P.2d at 689. In Arrovo. the only discussion of the type
of analysis to employ in making the attenuation determination was in a footnote.15

15

State v. Arrovo. supra at 690-691 (Fn. 4).
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In that footnote, it was suggested that the factors discussed in Brown v. Illinois. 422
U.S. 590 (1975); and LaFave. Search and Seizure, § 2(d) at 193-94 (2nd ed. 1987),
should be considered in determining this whether a voluntary consent was sufficiently
attenuated from an illegal stop.
The attenuation issue was next addressed by this court in Sims v. State Tax
Commission, supra. In that case a majority of the court held that the close proximity
in time to the initial stop and the lack of intervening circumstances invalidated any
voluntary consent. That case involved the same stop as the instant case. However,
as previously noted, the state contends that its holding is inconsistent with Thurman.
A close analysis of both of those cases shows that the holdings are not inconsistent.
In Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra, the court indicated that the attenuation
analysis should focus on the factors described in Brown v. Illinois, supra. Those
factors included: the temporal proximity of the illegal seizure and the consent, the
presence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct. In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court also noted
that two other factors should be discussed. The court stated,
In considering the factors listed in Brown, account
should also be taken of whether the illegal seizure brought
about police observation of the particular object they
sought consent to search, whether the consent was
volunteered rather than requested by the detaining officers,
whether the detainee was made aware of the fact that he
could decline to consent and thus prevent an immediate
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search, and whether the police purpose underlying the
illegality was to obtain the consent.
841 P.2dat 10.
In analyzing these factors in light of the circumstances of this case, the court
in Sims v. State Tax Commission, stated,
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, Sims'
consent was closely related in time to the initial stop. He
consented during the unlawful detention with no
intervening circumstances. The purpose of the roadblock
was to obtain evidence of criminal violations, a purpose
that does nothing to reduce the "flagrancy" of the
constitutional violation it precipitated. Trooper Howard's
request for consent to search Sims' vehicle was based
upon the smell of alcohol, the sight of an open liquor bottle,
and Sims' admission that he was carrying alcohol.
Howard's opportunity to make these observations and to
question Sims came about as a direct result of the illegal
seizure. Sims did not spontaneously volunteer his consent,
nor was he made aware of the fact that he could decline
consent.
Given the totality of these circumstances in light of
the relevant considerations, the voluntary consent in this
case clearly was arrived at by exploitation of the
unconstitutional roadblock. The consent did not, therefore,
purge the evidence of the taint of illegality,
id at 10.
In State v. Thurman, supra, the court also addressed the deterrent purpose in
the attenuation requirement. The court related the factors described in Brown v.
Illinois, supra, to this deterrent purpose. The importance of deterrence of flagrant or
purposeful police misconduct was noted. With respect to the other factors the court
stated,
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The deterrent value of suppressing evidence seized
following police illegality is negligible where the subsequent
consent to search is substantially separated either
temporally or circumstantially from the illegality.
846 P.2d at 1264. The court went on to describe how a flagrant or purposeful
fourth amendment violation would need to be followed by a substantial period of
time16 or significant intervening circumstances17 before a voluntary consent would
enable the seized evidence to be admissible.
The court in Thurman did not elaborate on the question of what might
constitute a purposeful or flagrant fourth amendment violation. However, the court
did state,
As the foregoing should suggest, the exploitation
analysis requires a balancing of the relative egregiousness
of the misconduct against the time and circumstances that
intervene before the consent is given. The nature and
degree of the illegality will usually be inversely related to

16

ln this case there was an extremely short period of time between the stop and
the consent, Sims v. State Tax Commissioner, supra.
17

ln Thurman the court found intervening circumstances to include the signing of
a second consent to search form and the transportation to a second location. Other
courts have found intervening circumstances to include release from custody, an
appearance before the magistrate, discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an
unrelated charge, United States v. Delaadillo-VelasQuez. 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.
1988); giving of the Miranda warning and allowing the defendant to consult with a
passenger, United States v. Berrv, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983); Juarez v. State.
708708 S.W. 2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), telling the defendant that he did not
have to consent to the search, Reves v. State, 741 S.W. 2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987); developing probable cause from independent sources to justify the detention
United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986); and whether the consent was
volunteered or requested, People v. Boraes, 69 N.Y. 2.d 1031, 511 N.E. 2d 58
(1987).
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the effectiveness of time and intervening events to
dissipate the presumed taint. Where the misconduct is
extreme, we will require a clean break in the chain of
events between the misconduct and the consent to find the
consent valid. . . . The same type of break should be
required where the evidence shows that the police
purposely engaged in conduct to induce a consent.
Conversely, where it appears that the illegality arose as the
result of negligence, the lapse of time between the
misconduct and the consent and the presence of
intervening events become less critical to the dissipation of
the taint.

IsL
Other courts have addressed that issue of what constitutes a purposeful or
flagrant violation. In United States v. Pierre, 932 F.2d 377 (5th Cir., 1991), the court
described three circumstances that would indicate that a search was purposeful or
flagrant: First it was made for the purpose of uncovering evidence of wrongdoing.
Second, the stop was conducted without a hint of individualized suspicion.18 Third,
the stop or search was part of an ongoing series of illegal searches. Other indications
of a purposeful or flagrant violation include: the use of firearms to effect the arrest,
People v. Odom. 83 III. App. 3d 1022, 404 N.E. 2d 997 (1980); a manner of arrest
or detention that caused confusion, surprise or fright, United States v. DelqadifloVelasauez. supra; the circumstances of the detention reflect that officers were on an
expedition to find evidence, Reves v. State, supra; or the use of threats or physical
force, United States v. Perez-Esoarza. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1980).

18

See also: United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983); State
v. Zielmen. 384 So. 2d 359 (La. 1980).
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In the instant case, the respondent's vehicle was stopped without any
individualized suspicion. There was no specific purpose for the roadblock. It was not
aimed at problems such as locating driver's license violators or drunk drivers. This
case involved a roadblock where a number of cars were stopped. By definition there
was a pattern of stops. It also included a showing of police authority. This court held
in

Sims v. State Tax Commission, "The purpose of the roadblock was to obtain

evidence of criminal violations, a purpose that does nothing to reduce the 'flagrancy'
of the constitutional violation it precipitated" 841 P.2d at 10.
There is no inconsistency between the holdings in Sims v. State Tax
Commission, supra, and State v. Thurman. supra. The fourth amendment violation
in the instant case was flagrant and purposeful. It is easy to conceive of more
flagrant violations. However, when a violation of this nature is balanced against he
fact that the consent followed almost immediately after the stop and that there were
no intervening circumstances, there is a lack of attenuation making the evidence
admissible in spite of the voluntary consent.
In its brief to this court in the instant case, the state fails to provide the analysis
required by Thurman. The only factor that the state addressed is the flagrancy of the
misconduct. For the court to adopt the states's suggested analysis, it would have to
disregard the factors of temporal proximity and intervening circumstances.
Furthermore, the state's position on the lack of flagrancy of the constitutional
violation is very weak. The only reason given by the state to show that the violation
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was not flagrant was that there were no Utah cases addressing the constitutionality
of roadblocks. The state also contends that Utah officers could believe roadblocks
were lawful because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had upheld New Mexico
roadblocks.19 This position disregards the fact that there was no statutory authority
to conduct a roadblock.20
purpose roadblocks.

Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit cases upheld single

A multipurpose roadblock, as used in this case, had been

implicitly rejected by that court, United States v. Lopez, supra. Finally, even in those
jurisdictions where roadblocks have been upheld, precautions had been taken to limit
the discretion of the officers who were involved in the conduct of the roadblock.
Similar precautions had not been taken in this case.21 The only conclusion that can
be reached is that the roadblock employed in this case consisted of a purposeful and
flagrant constitutional violation.
This court should not change or modify its holding in Sims v. State Tax
Commission, supra, on the attenuation issue. The roadblock utilized in this case was
a flagrant and purposeful violation of the fourth amendment and Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution. The consent that followed the roadblock stop was in close

19

United States v. Prichard 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Oberaon. 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lopez. 777 F.2d 543
(10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Corral. 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987).
20

See point I.C. supra.

21

See Respondent's opening brief filed in the Court of Appeals(attached in the
addendum).
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temporal proximity to the stop. There were no intervening circumstances between
the stop and the consent. There was insufficient attenuation between the stop of
respondent's vehicle and the voluntary consent to make the fruits of the search
admissible. This court's ruling in Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra, should be
reaffirmed, that would also result in affirming the court of appeals' ruling on this
issue.
CONCLUSION
The ruling of the court of appeals should be affirmed. This court should hold
that the roadblock violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Furthermore, the court should find that the voluntary consent was not sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal stop to preclude the application of the exclusionary rule.
The case should be remanded to the court of appeals with an order directing the court
of appeals to further remand the case to the district court with an order that a new
trial be granted at which the evidence seized during the search of respondent's vehicle
will not be admitted.
DATED this

day of June, 1993.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy
on this
day of June, 1993, to:

the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered

DAVID THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDUM

DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S
BRIEF ON APPEAL
POINT II

POINT II
THE ROADBLOCK AT WHICH APPELLANT WAS
STOPPED DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
SAFEGUARDS TO LIMIT THE DISCRETION OF
THE OFFICERS CONDUCTING IT, NOR DID IT
MINIMIZE
THE
INTERFERENCE
WITH
MOTORISTS'
PRIVACY
INTERESTS,
THUS
VIOLATING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
The

warrantless

stop

of

appellant's

vehicle

was a

"seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the
States

by

the

Constitution,

Fourteenth

Amendment

to

State v. Sierra, supra.

the

United

States

To determine if a stop

qualifies as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, a balancing test is to be employed, Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
The Supreme Court has applied this balancing test in
cases involving border searches for illegal aliens.

These cases

have been applied by courts in analyzing roadblock stops.

In

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 226 (1973), the Court
found a Fourth Amendment violation in the stop and search of a
moving vehicle by a roving border patrol.

In that case the agents

had no warrant, consent, probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
stop

the vehicle

specifically
prohibiting
country.

noted

in question.
that

or preventing

the

The Court
governemnt

aliens

from

in Almeida-Sanchez

has

an

illegally

interest
entering

in
the

However, that interest did not override the protections

of the Fourth Amendment,

The use of roving patrols to stop a

vehicle and question the occupants about their citizenship and
immigration status was also found to violate the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).

Such a stop

would be proper if the officers were aware of specific articulable
facts that would warrant suspicion that vehicle contains illegal
aliens.
With respect to a permanent checkpoint, the Court has
held that border patrol agents cannot search a vehicle without a
warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Ortiz,

422

U.S. 891

(1975).

Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543

However,

United States v.

in United

States v.

(1976), the Court held that the

brief questioning of vehicle occupants at a permanent checkpoint
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
distinctions
patrols.

between
First,

a

the

permanent
permanent

The Court made two critical
checkpoint

checkpoint

and

the

involved

potential interference with legitimate traffic.

roving
minimal

This is because

motorists using the highways are not taken by surprise as to the
location of the checkpoint.

Second, checkpoint operations involve

less discretion in law enforcement activity.

With respect to this

factor, the court made several observations:

The location of the

checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field. That decision
is made by officials responsible for allocating law enforcement
resources.

Finally,

there

is

little

likelihood

that

the

checkpoint will be located where
arbitrarily on motorists*

it will bear oppressively or

There is

less room for abusive or

harassing stops of individuals*
The
checks"

of

Supreme

motorists

Court
for

applied

licensing

this
and

reasoning
registration

to

"spot

checks.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

In that case an officer

stopped a motorist to make such a check.

The officer did not have

a warrant, probable

cause, or articulable

suspicion

that the

driver of the vehicle has been involved in any violation of the
law.

With respect to the test to be employed to determine the

propriety of the stop, the Court stated:
...the permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interest against its promotion of
legitimate
governmental
interests.
Implemented
in
this
manner,
the
reasonableness standard ususally requires, at
a minimum, that the facts upon which an
intrustion is based be capable of measurement
against "an objective standard", whether this
be probable cause or a less stringent test.
In those situations in which the balance of
interests precludes insistence upon "some
quantum of individualized suspicion", other
safeguards are generally relied upon to
assure that the individual's reasonable
expection of privacy is not "subject to the
discretion of the official in the field",
[footnotes ommitted]
440 U.S. at 654-655.
The Court noted that the interest asserted by the state
was highway safety.

The discretionary stop allowed officers to

make sure that the driver was properly licensed and insured and
that the vehicle was registered and safe to operate.

The Court

held that those interests do not outweigh the Fourth Amendment
violations.

This is especially true when considered in light of

mechanisms available to enforce traffic and safety regulations.
The Court stated that the foremost method of enforcing vehicle and
safety regulations is that of acting on observed violations.

It

was noted that unlicensed drivers are more likely to be found
among traffic violators and the chances of finding such a driver
by

enforcing

randomly

the traffic code would be much greater

stopping

involving safety
from the road.

drivers.
inspections

The Court

stated

that

than by

violations

generally are readily observable

Futhermore, in order for a vehicle to be licensed,

it must pass a safety inspection and the owner must show proof of
insurance.
The

Court

found

violate the Fourth Amendment.

that

such

"discretionary"

stops

The Court then went on to state in

dicta that roadblock stops may be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment:
Accordingly, we hold that except in those
situations in which there is at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a
motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile
is not registered, or that either the vehicle
or an occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law, stopping an
automobile and detaining the driver in order
to check his driver's license and the
registration
of
the
automobile
are

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
This holding does not preclude the State of
Delaware or other States from developing
methods for spot checks that involve less
intrusion or that do not
involve the
unconstrained
exercise
of
discretion.
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at
roadblock-type
stops
is
one
possible
alternative.
We hold only that persons in
automobiles on public roadways may not for
that reason alone have their travel and
privacy interfered with at the unbridled
discretion of police officers.
[footnote
ommitted]
440 U.S. at 6639
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47

(1979),

the Court

considered the constitutionality of a provision of the Texas Penal
Code which made it a crime for a person to refuse to give his
identity to a police officer upon request.
392 U.S. 1

Citing Terry v. Ohio,

(1968), the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment

allowed seizures of a person based on less than probable cause.
In determinng

the

reasonableness

of such

seizures, the Court

stated:
The reasonableness of seizures that are less
intrusive
than
a
traditional
arrest
[citations ommitted] depends "'on a balance
between
the
public
interest
and
the
individual's right to personal scrutiny free
from
arbitrary
interference
by
law
officers'".
[citations
ommitted]
Consideration of the constitutionality of
such seizures involve a weighing of the
gravity of the public concerns served by the
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, cert.
granted
U.S.
(1989) the Court granted certiorari to
review roadblock procedures under the Fourth Amendment.

seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances
the public
interest, and the
severity of the interference with individual
liberty.
Brown v, Texas, supra at 50-52.

The Court went on to apply the

test to that appellant's case, stating,
In the absence of any basis for suspecting
appellant of misconduct, the balance between
the public interest and appellant's right to
personal security and privacy tilts in favor
of freedom from police interference.
The
Texas statute under which appellant was
stopped and required to identify himself is
designed
to
advance
a weighty
social
objective in large metropolitan centers:
prevention of crime. But even assuming that
purpose is served to some degree by stopping
and
demanding
identification
from
an
individual without any specific basis for
believing
he
is
involved
in
criminal
activity, the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment do not allow it. When such a stop
is not based on objective criteria, the risk
of arbitrary and abusive police practices
exceed tolerable limits.
Brown v. Texas, supra at 52.
A number of state courts have applied the analysis from
Prouse and Brown to determine the propriety of roadblocks.

In

State v. Marchand, 104 Wash.2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (Wash. 1985), the
Supreme Court of Washington found the statement in Prouse relating
to the propriety of roadblocks to be dicta.

The court found that

the primary concern in Prouse was to limit the discretion of the
officers who were stopping motorists to inquire about driver's
license

and vehicle

registrations.

To analyze the

limits of

police discretion in roadblocks, the court in Marchand stated that

two other issues had to be addressed:

(1) What authority allows

officers to stop motorists for this purpose?
authority

meet

the

criteria

of

Prouse?

(2) Does that
This

consistent with the holding of the Supreme Court

analysis

is

in Colonnade

Catering Corporation v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).

In

that case the Court held that evidence had to be suppressed when
it was seized by state officers who lacked statutory authority to
conduct the search.

This result

was required even though there

was no Fourth Amendment violation.
The court in Marchand, supra, found that officers had
statutory authority to stop vehicles for the purpose of inspecting
drivers' licenses and registration.

However, that statute allowed

for the same type of stops that were prohibited by

Prouse.

The

statute allowed officers to stop motorists without probable cause
or

reasonable

suspicion

to

inspect

a

driver's

license

registration.

The court held that these statutes

constraints

the

on

officers' discretion.

and

imposed no

Consequently,

such

statutes could not justify a roadblock on a highway.

The State

had

instituted

argued

that

the

Washington

State

Patrol

guidelines to limit the discretion of officers.

had

Because such

guidelines do not carry the force and effect of a legislative act,
the court held that they could not overcome the constitutional
defects in that statute.

Under the Marchand analysis the roadblock in this case
also

fails

discussed,

to

pass

constitutional

muster.

As

in relation to the Utah Constitution,

there

statutory authority in Utah to conduct a roadblock.
statutes

require

that

the

officers

have

an

previously
is no

The Utah

individualized

suspicion of wrongdoing by the defendant before a stop may be
effected.

Since

there

is

no

Utah

statute

authorizing

a

roadblock, there is no limitation on the officers1 discretion in
operating a roadblock.

Consequently, the roadblock at issue here

violates the Fourth Amendment.
This court has addressed a roadblock stop in one
instance.12 m Other state courts have relied on both the dicta
from Prouse and the border patrol cases to uphold the use of
roadblocks.

However, in doing so, those courts have held that

certain criteria must be met before a roadblock can be found to
be "reasonable" as required by the Fourth Amendment.

In State v.

Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980), the court ruled that a
roadblock set up in a public park to take the names of drivers to
investigate vandalism was unreasonable.

The court noted that the

See: Point I.A. supra.
See, Utah Code Annotated § §77-7-15 and 44-1-17, (1953 as
amended).
12
In an unpublished opinion this court found that a roadblock
stop was unreasonable because all vehicles entering the roadblock
were not stoppped. In so holding, this court relied on Delaware
v. Prouse, supra. State v. Joe, Utah Court of Appeals, Case No,.
870537-CA (1988).
11

Fourth Amendment required that the degree of police intrusion be
balanced

against

interests.

the

promotion

of

legitimate

governmental

In analyzing the nature of the intrusion, the court

required that the state must show that four criteria be met:

(1)

The checkpoint was selected for visibility to oncoming traffic.
(2) There were

adequate

advance warning

signs

that

informed

motorists, in a timely manner, of the nature of the impending
intrusion,

(3) There were

uniformed

officers

and

official

vehicles in sufficient quantity to demonstrate the police power
of the community,
policy

making

(4) There must be a predetermination by

administrative

officers

of

the

time

of

the

roadblock, its location and the procedures to be employed.

All

of these criteria must be met in carefully formulated standards
and based on neutral criteria.
In State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan.
1983), the defendant had been arrested at a roadblock for drunk
driving.

The Supreme Court of Kansas analyzed the case law and

found that the Fourth Amendment required that a balancing test be
applied to determine if a roadblock would qualify as an exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

The court

noted that the legitimate governmental interests must be balanced
against the

degree of intrusion resulting from the stop.

In

balancing these interests, the court relied on the three prong
test described in Brown v. Texas, supra.

The court then enumer-

ated thirteen factors and conditions that may play a part in the
balancing test.

The court stated:

Among the factors which should be considered
are: (1) The degree of discretion, if any,
left to the officer in the field; (2) the
location designated for the roadblock; (3)
the time and duration of the roadblock; (4)
standards set by superior officers; (5)
advance notice to the public at large; (6)
advance warning to the individual approaching
motorist; (7) maintenance of safety conditions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (9) average
length of time each motorist is detained;
(10) physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of operation; (11) the
availability of less intrusive methods for
combating the problem; (12) the degree of
effectiveness of the procedure; and (13) any
other relevant circumstances which might bear
upon the test. Not all of the factors need
to~be favorable to the state but all of which
are applicable to a given roadblock should be
considered. Some, of course, such as unbridled discretion of the officer in the field,
would run afoul of Prouse regardless of other
favorable factors.
State v. Deskins, supra at 1185.
In this case, there was unbridled discretion left to
the officers.

Both Sergeant Mangelson and Howard testified that

once a vehicle was stopped, it was up to the individual officer
to decide what to do.

(Tr. 25-30, 58-59) The only directions

that were given to the officer were that they were to look for
license

and

registration

violations,

liquor

violations, drug

violations and any other type of criminal violations.

(Tr. 58)

Howard testified that once a vehicle was stopped and a license

and registration were produced, he had the discretion to let the
vehicle go on its way or to further question the occupants.
28)

(Tr.

Upon completion of such questioning, he then had complete

discretion to determine if further investigation was necessary
or if the motorist would be allowed to continue on his way.
Trooper

Howard

also

investigation was

testified

that

the

within his discretion.

nature

of

the

He could search the

vehicle or person, or call the dispatcher to check for arrest
warrants or stolen vehicle reports.

(Tr. 25-30)

The location of the roadblock was on Interstate 15.
That is the major thoroughfare between Salt Lake City and southern California. (Tr. 34)

The roadblock was commenced at 7:00

a.m. on Wednesday July 27, 1988.
date.

(Tr.

6, 48)

It ended at noon on that same

There was no evidence indicating why this

particular location date or time was selected.

There were no

written

officers

standards

established

by

superior

and

disseminated to those officers making the vehicle stops. (Tr. 6162)

Mangelson testified that the only directions he gave to the

officers were that they were to look for the various criminal
violations

previously

directions

were

session.
officers

not

described.
given

in any

(Tr.
written

22,

57)

form

of

These
briefing

Most important, there were no directions given to the
on

what

circumstances

would

require

further

investigation of a motorist once a driver's license and registration had been produced.

As for the warning requirements described in Deskins,
the general public was notified of the roadblock by publishing
notice in the Juab County newspaper.
weeks

before

testified

the

roadblock.

This was done about two

(Tr. 7,

33)

Trooper

that the vast majority of the motorists

stopped were from outside of Juab County.
appellant.

The effectiveness

of this

Howard

that were

This included the

notice was

negligible

because the roadblock was on a major interstate highway.
The advance notice at the approach to the roadblock
consisted of large orange signs that were about four feet square.
(Tr. 49)
49, 65)

The first sign had a picture of a flagman on it. (Tr.
That sign was located less than one-half mile from the

roadblock.

(Tr. 56)

(Tr. 49, 57)

The final sign indicated "All Vehicles Must Stop".

(Tr. 49, 57)

The next sign stated "Prepare to Stop".

Several hundred feet beyond the last sign, a

uniformed highway patrol trooper was signaling vehicles to pull
over.
were
55)

(Tr.

49)

Sergeant Mangelson testified that the signs

the same as those used at road construction areas.
None

of

the

approaching a roadblock.

signs

indicated

(Tr. 56)

that

motorists

(Tr.
were

Such signs failed to notify

motorists of the pending intrusion. Furthermore, the speed limit
in this area of the interstate is 65 miles per hour.

(Tr. 21)

At that speed, the location of the signs gave motorists less
than thirty seconds notice of either the necessity to stop or the
pending intrusion.

With

respect

to

safety

conditions,

the

evidence

indicated that motor homes and semi-tractors with trailers were
waived through to avoid congestion at the roadblock,

(Tr. 58)

The degree of fear and anxiety generated by this roadblock had to
be

substantial.

subjected

Travelers

on

the

interstate

freeway

to a roadblock with little or no notice.

were

Trooper

Howard indicated that in addition to requesting the motorists'
licenses

and

registrations,

he

would

ask

possession of any weapons, drugs or alcohol.

if

they

were

(Tr. 30)

in

Such a

question would be very disconcerting to the average motorist.
There was no indication that the purpose of the roadblock was
explained

to those people who were stopped.

The

roadblock

created a great

physical inconvenience just from being stopped

on the freeway.

It is also very likely that substantial fear and

anxiety were

created both from the stop and also from the nature

of this questioning.
The last factors described by the court in Deskins are
similar to the three pronged test described in Brown v. Texas,
supra.

Those factors weigh heavily against the state and fail to

justify this roadblock.

The first prong of that test involves

the weighing of the gravity of the public concerns.

In this case

Sergeant Mangelson testified that the purpose of the roadblock
was to detect virtually all types of criminal activity.
50)

(Tr.

There is no question that the public has a great concern in

the detection of crime.

However in City of Seattle v. Mesiani,

110 Wash. 2d 454r 755 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1988), the Supreme Court of
Washington was critical of asserting such a broad public interest
in applying a balancing test to a roadblock issue.
stated,

"A

fairer

balance

would

weigh

the

actual

The court
expected

alleviation of the social ills against the cumulated interests
invaded".

755 P. 2d at 778.

The court then suggested that

alternative means of law enforcement that do not interfere with
privacy interests be used.
The second issue that must be addressed under Brown is
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest.
The roadblock in this case is distinguishable from that described
in Deskins, supra.

There the roadblock was set up specifically

to detect drunk drivers.

It was placed at a location and at a

time where there had been a history of drunk driving problems.
In this case, the officers had multiple purposes for the roadblock.

There was no indication why the particular time and

location were selected.
roadblock

The only

indication as to how this

aided officers in detecting crime was that

officers

could stop vehicles that they would not otherwise be able
stop without violating the Fourth Amendment.
officers

were not

given

any directions

to a

Furthermore, the

or procedures

to be

followed after a driver's license and registration were produced.
The officers had unlimited discretion to release a driver, detain

him for questioning, run a warrants check through the dispatcher,
or request to

search the vehicle,

The final

(Tr. 25-30, 58-59).

issue to be addressed under Brown is the

severity of the interference with individual liberty.
be analyzed

in terms of both the physical

interference caused by the stop.

This must

and psychological

Delaware v. Prouse, supra.

The potential for great incovenience and extreme anxiety have
been discussed at length with respect to the factors required by
State v. Deskins, supra.
In State v. Smith, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Oklahoma discussed the test given in Brown v. Texas, supra, as
it related to a roadblock established for the purpose of checking
for individuals driving without a license.

The court noted that

the circumstances surrounding the roadblock indicated that its
actual purpose was to detect drunk driving violations.

With

respect to the other two factors from Brown,the court stated:
The Court finds such activites by law
enforcement authorities, while commendable in
their ultimate goal of removing DUI offenders
from the public highways, draw dangerously
close to what may be referred to as a police
state. Here, the state agencies have ignored
the presumption of innocence, assuming that
criminal conduct must be occuring on the
roads and highways, and have taken an "end
justifies the means" approach. The Court is
not so naive to think that criminal conduct
does not occur regularly in the form of DUI
offenders.
Yet, a basic tenet of American
jurisprudence is that the government cannot
assume criminal conduct in effectuating a
stop such as the one presented herein. Were
-?£-

the authorities allowed to maintain such
activities as presented in this caser the
next logical step would be to allow similar
stops for searching out other types of
criminal offenders.
674 P. 2d at

564.

With respect

to the case at bar,

it is

important to note that Sergeant Mangelson candidly admitted that
the purpose

of

the roadblock

was to

look

for

any

criminal

violations in addition to various motor vehicle violations.

(Tr.

57)
In Simmons v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1989),
the

Supreme Court

of Virginia

held

violated the Fourth Amendment.

that

a D.U.I,

roadblock

The Court found that the only

part of the roadblock plan that limited the officer's discretion
was that all traffic was stopped.
insufficient limit on discretion.

The Court found that to be an
The statute has no explicit

plan or practice with respect to roadblock stops.
the

location

and duration

of

the roadblock

Furthermore,

were within

the

discretion of the officers. That situation is indistinguishable
from the case at bar.
This case is also

very similar to State ex rel Ekstrom

v. Justice Court of State, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983).

In that

case, a roadblock was established near Kingman, Arizona.

A local

Department of Public Safety lieutenant authorized the roadblock.
The purpose of the roadblock was to enforce the state's drunk
driving

laws.

The officers manning

the

roadblock

were not

instructed on the procedures to be used at the roadblock.
were

no

subjected

warning
to

a

signs

indicating

roadblock

nor was

published regarding the roadblock.
found

that

requirements

this
of

particular

United

Amendment.

there

motorists
any

would

advance

be

notice

The Arizona Supreme Court

roadblock

States

Delaware v. Prouse, supra.

that

There

v.

did

not

Briqnoni-Ponce,

meet
supra,

the
or

Consequently, it violated the Fourth

In so holding, the court stated,
...we cannot agree that the intrusion generated by the Kingman roadblocks was minimal.
The record established that the Kingman
checkpoints involved a not insubstantial
amount of discretionary
law enforcement
activity and that the manner in which the
roadblocks were operated was somewhat irregular.
The roadblocks were set up at the
discretion of a local highway patrolman and
were operated without specific directions or
guidelines. Officers were uncertain whether
they should simply question the occupants of
motor vehicles or whether they should seize
the^ opportunity to cursorily search the
vehicles for evidence of a violation. Motorists were taken by surprise, not having had
prior notice of the location and purpose of
the checkpoints.
We find present in the
Kingman operation the grave danger that such
discretion might be abused by the officer in
the field, a factor which caused the Court in
[Delaware v.] Prouse, supra, much concern.

623 P.2d at 996.
In

this

case,

a

local

authorization for the roadblock.

lieutenant

(Tr. 55)

gave

verbal

The advance notice

published in the Juab County newspaper would be ineffective in
notifying interstate travelers of the roadblock.

Likewise, the

signs used at this roadblock were also ineffective in limiting
the fear and anxiety caused by a roadblock.

The signs did not

indicate that motorists were being subjected to a detention at
the hands of law enforcement agents.

Finally, the officers were

not given specific directions on how to conduct the roadblock.
Thus, the officers had unfettered discretion in the manner in
which the roadblock was conducted.

Consequently, this roadblock

did not meet the objective standards

required by the Fourth

Amendment.
The stop of appellant's vehicle was unreasonable.

The

fruits of the search of that vehicle were seized in violation of
his right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable searches
and seizures as described in the Fourth Amendment.
must be ordered to be suppressed.

Those fruits

Appellant's conviction should

be reversed and a new trial ordered.

CONCLUSION
The roadblock
without

stop of appellant's vehicle was done

a warrant and was unreasonable under both Article If

Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.

The proper remedy for this

violation is the suppression of the evidence seized as a result
of

the

stop.

appellant

was

The
the

critical
kilogram

evidence
of

that

cocaine.

was

seized

Since

that

from
was

OPINIONS FROM THE
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB, COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff.

)

vs.

)

Case Number, 151-D

LOUIS SIMS,

)

GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

Defendant,

)
********

This matter came before the Court on the 31st day of
January, 1989 in Juab County, State of Utah, on the Motion of the
Defendant to Suppress Evidence secured pursuant to the search of
a vehicle he was driving when stopped at a road block in Juab
County at approximately mile post 220-

The State of Utah was

represented by the Juab County Attorney, Donald Eyre, and the
defendant by his counsel, G. Fred Metos.

From the evidence

presented the Court makes the following findings:
1.

Peace Officers representing the Juab County

Sheriff's Office and the Utah Highway Patrol planned and executed
a road block on July 27, 1988 al approximately 2 miles south of
Nephi, on the north bound portion oT lnlcrslalc 15-

Prior notice

of the road block was given through media publication to the
effect that all motor vehicles except semi-trucks would be

stopped for drivers licenses, vehicle registration, and
mechanical checks, commencing at 7:00 a.m.

Ten to twelve

officers participated at the site of the blockade where proper
advanced signing was given to approaching vehicles.
Participating law enforcement officers were in uniform and with
patrol cars present.
Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol conducted
a briefing prior to the road block of those participating wherein
inquiry was first to be made of drivers licenses, and automobile
registration, and that observations of the vehicles for equipment
or alcohol violations including driving under the influence, and
also for controlled substance violation.

If no violations were

apparent the vehicles were to be immediately released for
continuation of travel.

Citations or arrests were to be made for

violations detected at the stop.
The defendant, Louis E. Sims, vehicle was stopped at
the road block at approximately 9:00 a.m.

A trooper asked him

for his registration and drivers license which were produced.
The automobile was registered in Utah and the driver, Mr. Sims,
had a Georgia drivers license.

The officer detected a odor of

alcohol, and observed an open container of alcohol in the rear of
the car.

The defendant denied the presence of weapons or

contraband, but admitted the presence of alcohol in the vehicle.
Upon request of the officer consent was obtained for the search

of the vehicle-

Sergearnt Mangelson assisted the trooper, Carl

Howard, in the search.

In addition to the open container of

alcohol the search of the backseat revealed two marijuana joints
in the back right hand side ashtray-

The defendant voluntarily

opened the trunk and Howard conducted a field sobriety test of
him.

Mangelson search the trunk and after discovery of

additional marijuana the defendant exhibited nervousness and
asked the officer to stop the search.

Mangelson continued the

search and in the tire compartment found a one kilogram brick of
cocaine.
Arrest was made of the defendant for driving under the
influence and for controlled substance violations.
Based on the foregoing findings of the court the first
issue to be resolved is whether the road block stop of the
defendant was a reasonable seizure, and not in violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment Constitutional Rights.
The only pertinent Utah authority in this area is the
case of State of Utah v. Timothy Jo, case number 870537-CA, Utah
Court of Appeals filed September 20, 1988.

In that case a

Sergeant Rudy Cook established a road block in San Juan County
near Mexican Hat, approximately 100 feet from the entrance to the
Navajo Indian Reservation in the early morning hours of March 29,
1986.

Cook received no prior authorizaLion from the sheriff's

office nor did he receive any call back after having called in

the road block that the operation was not authorized and he
therefore proceeded.
The road block was so located that there was
surrounding light from commercial buildings and a street light
together with police vehicles parked on both sides of the highway
with flashing red spot lights activated as vehicles approached,
these lights could be seen for two tenths of a mile.

There were

two officers and a civilian assisting Sergeant Cook who advised
those assisting him to "check everyone as they come for regular
traffic inspection, proper registration, proper drivers license-^
check for intoxicated people, open containers."
The Court of Appeals cited Delaware v.Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979), where the United Supreme Court held that a violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution occurs when
police detain a motorist to check drivers license and
registration without..."articulable and reasonable suspicion the
motorist is unlicensed, the automobile is not registered, or that
the vehicle or occupant may be seized for a violation of law."
In a dicta the Supreme Court stated that the above
holding does not deter a state..."from developing methods for
spot checks that involve Jess intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstitutional exercise of discretion

Questioning of all

oncoming traffic at road block-type stops is one possible
alternative."

The Court thus limited the decision to..."only

that persons in automobiles on public highways may not for that
reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the
unbridled discretion of police officers,"
The facts in Timothy Jo were uncontroverted that two
vehicles immediately preceding the defendant were allowed

to

pass through the blockade without being detained, and therefore
that such unbridled discretion was volative of the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure.
Since the Prouse case the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in the case of United States of America
vs. Gregory McFadden, was presented the same issue as is before
this Court.

Citing the Prouse case for the concept that stopping

an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments even
though the stop is limited and resulting detention quite brief.
The Court in McFadden emphasized that "such seizures are
unconstitutional, however, only if they are unreasonable."

The

Court went on to say that "in determining the reasonableness of a
seizure a Court must balance the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty."

The Court went on to

say that..."a seizure

must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that
societies legitimate interests require the seizure of the

particular individual or.-."the seizure must be carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers."
The Court in McFadden also cited United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, (1976), where the Supreme Court
upheld the stopping of motor vehicles on a highway near Mexico
for brief questions to determine whether illegal aliens were
present.

Noting that the check point where all vehicles were

stopped was permanent and the degree of detention consistent with
the Forth Amendment and did not require a warrant.

The regular

manner in which established check points are operated is visible
evidence, reassuring to law abiding motorists that the stops are
duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. Other
authorities were cited wherein

automobile road blocks held in a

clearly visible check point where all vehicles were inspected for
legal aliens, drivers license, vehicle registration, and proof of
insurance, where the road block was "established in a systematic
manner to stop vehicles in a pattern which protected the public
from the officers unbridled discretion,..."past constitutional
muster."

The Court pointing out that a single officer stopping a

car along a road to check drivers licenses, and registration
because of suspicious conduct of watching officers through the
rear view mirror, that such a search was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.

The Court stating that "a roving police stop

is a more serious intrusion than a predicted check point
inspection, because the unexpected stop is pregnant with great
annoyance and inconvenience, and more likely to frighten or
embarrass."
In sustaining the road block imposed the McFadden case
the Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that the road block was
to regulate vehicular traffic by allowing the check of drivers
license and vehicle registrations-

And that the side effect of

deterring drug sellers trafficking in areas where the road block
was posted did not render the blockade unlawful.
The fact that a history of escalating drug traffic
along this stretch of Interstate 15 as a result of other arrests,
tends to legitimize the public interest in predetermined check
points, systematically pursued by officers to minimize the burden
to individual citizens without discretion to engage in random
roving stops.
The Court concludes that the road block in question in
this case was so planned and so executed as to render the
inconvenience to the traveling public to be minimal, and so
structured to neutralize the officers conducting the road block
to a minimal intrusion on the traveling public's time and
inconvenience.
As to the conduct of the police officers after having
affected a lawful stop the Court concludes that it became readily

apparent to the officers senses that the defendant had been
drinking, and as a result of that and of sobriety tests given
him, he was charged with driving under the influence.

Also, the

officer noted an open alcohol container in the vehicle and
obtained the consent from the driver to search the backseat where
he found two marijuana roaches in the right rear cigarette tray,
and asked the driver to open the trunk which he did.

There is

no evidence of coercion or duress to undermine the voluntary
character of the consent given to the search of the car,
including the trunk where marijuana was found.

Thereafter the

defendant withdrew his consent to continue the search, but the
officer proceeded and found a kilo of cocaine in the spare tire
well.

The presence of the marijuana in the trunk compartment

gave the officer reasonable cause to believe that additional
contraband was probably present in the accessible areas of the
trunk and which legitimized his search into the tire well where
the cocaine was found.
The Court concludes that all of the actions of the
officers was legal and lawful and that the contraband obtained in
admissible evidence in prosecutions for controlled substance
violations and other violations detected and charged and a result
of this stop.

The Motion of the Defendant to Suppress the Evidence in
this case is therefore denied.

This matter is set for jury trial

on the 28th day of March, 1989 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. in
Nephi, Juab County, State of Utah.
Dated this 2- ^day of February, 1989.
BY THE COURT

GEORGE £1 BALLIF, JUDGE/
cc:

counsel

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

STATE OF UTAH,

Case Number 151-D

Plaintiff,
vs.
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

LOUIE EDWIN SIMS,
Defendant.
********

On or about the 24th day of February, 1989 this Court
entered its ruling denying the motion of defendant to suppress
evidence in this case claiming the same to have been secured as
the result of an unlawful seizure of the defendant in violation
of his constitutional rights.
Defendant has moved the Court to reconsider its
ruling..."for the reason that the Court failed to addressed the
issue of the constitutionality of the stop of defendant's vehicle
pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah."
The Court has reviewed the memorandum submitted by the
TJS"fendant, and finds that it did not fail to consider the issue
as to the broader protection afforded under the Utah Constitution
to the personal rights protected by the Utah Constitution as
opposed to Article 4 of the Federal Constitution and the
application of

federal law in the area of search and seizure.

The Court refers counsel to the findings made by the
Court with reference to the road block, the m.itL«.-r in which it
was constituted, the notice given the public as to its operation
on a given dayf the reasonableness of the detention provided and

.he limitation on discretion of an officer to pick and choose
amongst the traveling public as to who would be stopped and who
allowed to past.
The Timothy Joe case is factually distinguishable from
the case of the United State of America vs. McFadden, and
although there seems to be no other Utah case than Timothy Joe
which has addressed the road block issue, McFadden, would seem to
be within the scope of police activity which would be found not
to violate Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah, and
that the activities of the police in the case before the Court
would be consistent with McFadden and found by the courts of this
state not to constitute an unreasonable seizure of a defendant
and incriminating evidence of a violation of law.
The Court therefore again affirms its ruling as
announced in the Ruling dated February 24, 1989 which denies the
defendant's motion to suppress in this case.
Dated this

day of April, 1989.
BY THE COURT

GEORGE E: BALLIF, JUI>dE

cc:

Donald Eyre
Fred Metos
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
Louie Edwin SIMS, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890463-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 15, 1991.
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth
District Court, Juab County, George E.
Ballif, J., of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value,
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) roadblock at
which defendant's vehicle was stopped violated both Fourth Amendment and Utah
Constitution, and (2) defendant's consent to
search his vehicle, made after vehicle was
stopped at illegal roadblock, was arrived at
by exploitation of roadblock, and was invalid.
Reversed and remanded.
Orme, J., filed specially concurring
opinion.
1. Criminal Law <8=»1031(1)
Issue of whether roadblock conducted
by police violated Federal and State Constitutions was properly preserved for appeal,
although State admitted that roadblock
was unconstitutional for sake of argument,
where defendant argued unconstitutionality of roadblock throughout proceeding and
there was ample factual record from which
issue could be assessed. Const. Art. 1,
§ 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
2. Searches and Seizures <s=>18
Roadblock or motorist "checkpoint" is
"seizure" under Fourth Amendment and
Utah Constitution. Const. Art. 1, § 14;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Searches and Seizures s=>60
Utah statutes governing vehicle inspections, regulation of traffic, and stops

based on reasonable suspicion did not apply
in determining whether suspicionless investigatory roadblocks were permissible.
Const. Art. 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 4, 14; U.C.A.1953, 23-20-19, 27l(M(l)(b), 27-12-19, 41-l-17(c), 77-7-15.
4. Searches and Seizures <s»60
Suspicionless, investigatory roadblock
in which vehicles and drivers were screened
for possible violations of law violated
Fourth Amendment; no explicit plan, beyond determination that all vehicles other
than large trucks were to be stopped, governed roadblock, officers who authorized
roadblock were not politically accountable
officials, and there was no indication that
authorization process involved balancing
Fourth Amendment interests and law enforcement interest or assessment of effectiveness of roadblock in meeting those interests. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Searches and Seizures <s=>ll, 23
Fourth Amendment balancing test applies to warrantless seizures that, if not
based upon articulable suspicion of individual, must be carried out pursuant to plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on
conduct of individual officers; additionally,
such plan should be developed by politically
accountable officials with unique understanding of and responsibility for, limited
public resources, including finite number of
police officers. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Searches and Seizures <s=>60
Politically accountable officials, not the
courts, are responsible for performing initial balancing between Fourth Amendment
and interests served by plan authorizing
roadblock. U.S.C.A ConstAmend. 4.
7. Searches and Seizures <s=60
Suspicionless, investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks, conducted without legislative authorization, are per se unconstitutional under search and seizure provision of
Utah Constitution. Const. Art. 1, § 14.
8. Criminal Law <s=»394.6(2)
Unless ground for suppression is unknown or unavailable to defendant at time
suppression motion is filed, right to challenge admission of evidence on that ground
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U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12 (Re-

9. Criminal Law <S=>1031(1)
Defendant's failure to argue at trial
that there was insufficient attenuation between his consent to search of his automobile and initial illegal stop of vehicle at
roadblock did not preclude consideration of
issue on appeal, where, because of thenstanding decisions effectively holding that
noncoerced consent to search, by itself,
purged the taint of primary illegality,
nonattenuation argument was unavailable
at tnal. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12 (Repealed).
10. Searches and Seizures <s=>184
Defendant's consent to search of his
vehicle, made after vehicle was stopped at
illegal roadblock, was arrived at by exploitation of roadblock, and was invalid; consent was obtained within minutes of illegal
stop, and defendant did not spontaneously
volunteer his consent. Const. Art. 1, § 14;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
G. Fred Metos (Argued), Yengich, Rich,
Xaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R.
Larsen (Argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Louie Edwin Sims appeals his conviction
of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute for value, Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (Supp.1988), a
second degree felony. Sims claims the
1. Sergeant Mangelson's efforts to thwart illegal
drug trafficking are well known in Utah's appellate courts. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (reversing State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct.
App.1989)); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah
1986); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct.
App.1988); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). See also United States v. Corral,
899 F.2d 991 (10th Cir.1990). Besides the
present case, at least one other case involving
an automobile search by Sergeant Mangelson is

stop of his vehicle in a roadblock conducted
by the Utah Highway Patrol was an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Following oral argument, three cases relevant to the issues presented in this appeal
were decided. Those cases are Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S.
,
110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990);
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990);
and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990). Accordingly, we granted Sims' motion for supplemental briefing. Having
considered the supplemental briefs, we now
reverse his conviction, and remand for a
new trial in which evidence seized from
Sims' vehicle is to be suppressed.
FACTS
On the morning of July 27, 1988, officers
from the Utah Highway Patrol and Juab
County Sheriff's Office conducted a roadblock on Interstate Highway 15 approximately two miles south of Nephi, Utah.
The roadblock was planned and supervised
by Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul
Mangelson.1 Its purpose was to detect
driver's license, automobile registration,
and equipment violations, as well as liquor
and drug violations. Notice that the roadblock would take place was published in the
Juab County Times News two to four
weeks prior to the roadblock. There was
no evidence that the News was distributed
outside of Juab County. Interstate 15 is a
major north-south route and link between
Salt Lake City, Utah and Los Angeles, California.
According to Mangelson, no written policy, from the Highway Patrol or from any
pending in this court. State v. Kitchen, No.
900307-CA. As a central player in at least five
published search and seizure scenarios to date,
the redoubtable trooper's notoriety is approaching that of Max 25, a narcotics detection dog
whose nose for crime has figured in at least
seven published federal cases in the District of
Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Colyer,
878 F.2d 469, 471 and n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1989), and
cases cited therein.
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other source, existed to guide the conduct
of the roadblock in question. Mangelson
indicated that his supervising lieutenant
had given him permission to conduct the
roadblock.
The roadblock was staffed by about ten
uniformed officers. A series of three signs
within a one-half mile distance directed
drivers to the roadblock, marked by orange
cones. Large trucks were not stopped, because stopping them might cause hazardous traffic congestion. Sergeant Mangelson instructed officers to inspect driver's
licenses and vehicle registration of the
stopped motorists; while doing this, they
were to watch for signs of liquor and drug
violations. Officers could hold vehicles for
further investigation if the initial contact
raised questions. One of the officers,
Trooper Carl Howard, indicated that his
practice also included asking all drivers,
regardless of suspicion, if they had alcohol,
weapons, or contraband in their vehicles.2
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Sims' vehicle, a Chrysler sedan, was stopped at the
roadblock. Trooper Howard, the first officer to contact Sims, saw nothing to cause
him to suspect a violation of the law as
Sims' vehicle approached.3 Howard asked
for Sims' driver's license and vehicle registration. Sims produced a valid Georgia
driver's license and a Utah registration in
his name. In response to the trooper's
question, Sims stated that he was en route
from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City. While
talking with Sims, Trooper Howard smelled
alcohol inside the sedan and saw an "open"
liquor bottle in the back seat area. He
asked Sims if there were any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in the vehicle. Sims admitted
that there was alcohol in the vehicle, but
denied carrying drugs or weapons.
2. As indicated by the following exchange at the
suppression hearing, an affirmative answer to
this question could prompt Trooper Howard to
then seek consent to search automobiles without any other suspicion of wrongdoing:
Q (Mr. Metos): Just out of curiosity, did
anybody answer "yes" [to query about alcohol, weapons, or contraband] when everything appeared in order so you would have to
conduct a further search?

Howard then asked Sims to exit the sedan, and asked for consent to look inside.
Sims consented. Sergeant Mangelson approached and helped Howard search the
car's interior. They discovered the remnants of one or two marijuana cigarettes in
the right rear passenger door ashtray. Howard then asked Sims if he would mind if
they searched the trunk of the sedan.
Sims agreed and opened the trunk. Mangelson searched the trunk while Howard
conducted field sobriety tests on Sims nearby.
In a suitcase in the trunk, Mangelson
discovered two small plastic bags containing marijuana. Sims, becoming visibly
nervous, then stated that he wanted the
search stopped. Mangelson told Sims that,
based on the discovery of marijuana, he
had probable cause to continue searching
the trunk. Looking in the spare tire well,
Mangelson found a kilogram brick of cocaine. Sims was then arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol and possession of a controlled substance.
Before trial, Sims filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from his vehicle,
contending that the roadblock stop was an
unlawful seizure under the Utah and federal constitutions and that the officers lacked
probable cause to search the trunk. Following- an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied Sims' motion. The court determined that (1) the roadblock stop did not
violate the Utah or federal constitutions;
(2) Sims voluntarily consented to the search
of the vehicle, including the trunk; and (3)
Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to
continue searching the trunk after Sims'
withdrawal of consent. Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
and on the parties' written stipulation to
the evidence, the trial court found Sims
A (Trooper Howard): Yes. I've had several
people do that.
3. Re-cross examination of Trooper Howard by
defense counsel included the following exchange:
Q: You had no reason to believe [Sims] was
doing anything wrong as he entered the roadblock or breaking any law; is that correct?
A: That's correct.
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guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
ISSUES
On appeal, Sims argues that (1) the roadblock stop of his vehicle violated his right
to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures under article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution;
and (2) there was insufficient attenuation
between the unlawful detention and any
consent to overcome the illegality of the
roadblock.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ROADBLOCK

oughly argued the unconstitutionality of
the roadblock, on both federal and state
grounds, throughout these proceedings.4
The transcript of the suppression hearing
and the trial court's written findings on the
issue provide an ample factual record from
which we can assess the constitutionality
of this roadblock. The issue, therefore,
has been properly preserved and squarely
presented on appeal.
We are aware of the rule that we should
avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so. State v. Anderson,
701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). This
roadblock, however, was not an isolated
incident, and our police may continue to use
suspicionless roadblocks as a law enforcement tool.5 This makes all Utah motorists
subject to closer police scrutiny than they
might expect or, arguably, be legitimately
required to encounter.

Sims' first point on appeal deals solely
with the permissibility _o£ the roadblock itself. Because it is undisputed that the
roadblock was conducted with neither a
[2] The right of citizens to be secure
warrant nor suspicion of wrongdoing by
from
unreasonable seizures "shall not be
Sims, and that no emergency situation neviolated."
U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah
cessitated it, the question of whether the
Const,
art.
I, § 14 (emphasis added). A
roadblock was improper is reduced to one
roadblock
or
motorist''checkpoint" is a seiof law, and we review it without deference
zure
under
the
fourth amendment, Michito the trial court. Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
gan
Dep't
of
State
Police v. Sitz, — U.S.
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); State v.
,
110
S.Ct.
2481,
2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412
Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah CtApp.
(1990);
State
v.
Talbot,
792 P.2d 489, 491
"1989).
(Utah CtApp. 1990); there is no reason to
The State neither contests nor accepts hold otherwise with respect to our state
Sims' arguments that the roadblock violat- constitution. For the benefit of our citied the fourth amendment to the United zens, as well as that of police charged with
States Constitution and article I, section 14 enforcing our laws, it behooves us to decide
of the Utah Constitution. Rather, the whether the roadblock that netted Sims
State invites us to decide this case solely on was constitutionally permissible. We hold
the basis of the attenuation issue. That is, that it was not.
we are to "assum[e] arguendo that the stop
was illegal," and remand this case for fact Statutory Authority to Conduct Roadfinding on whether Sims' consent to search blocks.
his vehicle was obtained through exploita[3] A prelude to the constitutional
tion of the stop.
analysis per se is a determination of wheth[1] We believe it inappropriate in this er any statutory authority either permits or
case, however, to simply assume that the prohibits roadblocks of the sort conducted
roadblock was unconstitutional, without here, that is, a suspicionless, investigatory
analysis. Sims has steadfastly and thor- ro_adblock in which vehicles and drivers are
4. By thoroughly briefing state constitutional
concerns in his argument, Sims has answered
calls by Utah's appellate courts for a state constitutional analysis of search and seizure issues.
See, £.£., Earl, 716 P.2d at 805-06; State v.

Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.
1988) (citing cases).
5. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah
CtApp. 1990).
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screened for possible violations of law.6
We note several statutes of interest, but
none apply here.
The Utah Department of Transportation
operates ports of entry at which all large
vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock
are stopped and inspected for, among other
things, driver qualifications, registration,
tax payments, size and weight, and safety.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-19 (Supp.1990).
Our fish and game laws give the Division
of Wildlife authority to conduct roadblocks
or game checking stations under Utah
Code Ann. § 23-20-19 (1984), which makes
it unlawful to fail to stop at such stations.
These provisions are obviously inapplicable
here.
We also note that the Utah Highway
Patrol is charged with the duty of "regulating] traffic on all highways and roads
of the state."
Utah Code Ann.
§ 27-10-4(l)(b) (1989). This provision
might authorize roadblock-type operations
at, for example, accident scenes, or where
hazardous road or traffic conditions require
extra control. However, because this section in no way implies authority to conduct
investigatory operations, it does not apply
here.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) allows
a peace officer to "stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in
the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his
actions." 7 Similarly, Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-l-17(c) (1988) requires officers to stop
a vehicle for driver's license, registration,
6. Under our characterization of this roadblock,
it does not fit into the traditional "three levels"
of police stops, that have been described as
follows:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at [any
time] and pose questions so long as the citizen
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer
may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however,
the "detention must be temporary and last no
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or is
being committed.

and general inspection upon reasonable
belief that any vehicle is being operated in
violation of any provision of this act or of
any other law regulating the operation of
vehicles
" These codifications of the
familiar "reasonable suspicion" standard of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), were clearly not enacted with roadblock-type stops in mind; rather, they apply to the singling out of particular individuals or vehicles by the police,
based on particularized suspicion.
We find nothing in the Utah code that
specifically prohibits the roadblock that
was conducted here, however. Therefore,
we query whether the roadblock was constitutionally prohibited.
Fourth

Amendment

[4] In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court implied
that roadblock stops for the purpose of
checking driver's licenses and vehicle registrations might be constitutionally permitted. Holding that a routine stop of an
individual vehicle for such purpose, without
articulable individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing, was impermissible under the
fourth amendment, the Court commented
that "[t]his holding does not preclude the
State of Delaware or other States from
developing methods for spot checks that
involve less intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstrained exercise of discretion.
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v.
Memtt, 736 F.2d 223. 230 (5th Cir.1984), cert,
denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed.2d
696 (1986)). The level of individualized suspicion, i.e., none, is the same as with a level one
stop. However, since drivers were required to
stop and had no opportunity to decline to participate, the roadblock stop went well beyond a
level one encounter. It did not, however, qualify as a level two or three stop, since no individualized suspicion prompted the stop.
7. This provision has been characterized as a
legislatively enacted version of the so-called level two stop. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,
541 (Utah Ct.App.1990); note 6 supra.
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The Prouse dictum fell on receptive ears,
and in Sitz, the Court considered an investigatory roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint,"
operated by the Michigan State Police Department. The checkpoint was operated
under guidelines created by a special state
advisory committee composed of law enforcement officials and transportation j-esearchers from the University of Michigan.
Those guidelines governed checkpoint publicity, site selection, and police procedure at
the checkpoint itself. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at
2483-84.
Under the guidelines, all motorists traveling through the checkpoint were stopped
and briefly checked for intoxication. Only
if the initial examination revealed signs of
intoxication would a motorist would be directed out of the traffic flow for a driver's
license and registration check and further
sobriety tests. The Sitz checkpoint was
maintained for one hour and fifteen minutes. During that time, 126 vehicles were
stopped for an average of twenty-five seconds each. The checkpoint yielded two arrests—approximately one and one-half percent of stopped drivers—for driving under
the influence. Id. at 2484.
Utilizing a balancing test developed in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116
(1976) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99
S Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), the Supreme Court held that Michigan's sobriety
checkpoint passed fourth amendment muster. The brief detention of motorists at the
checkpoint was found to be only a "slight"
infringement of their fourth amendment
interests. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2486. Outweighing this infringement were "the magnitude of the drunken driving problem
[and] the States' interest in eradicating it,"
id at 2485, along with the Court's assessment that the one and one-half percent
drunk driver arrest rate demonstrated that
the checkpoint adequately advanced that
interest. Id. at 2487-88; see also Brown,
443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640 and
cases cited therein (permissibility of non-ar8. The court's definition of the public interest
pursued. i.e., detection of illegal drug trafficking, appears to be contrary to testimony about
the generalized purposes of the roadblock.

rest seizure requires weighing public interest served thereby, degree to which it
serves the interest, and severity of interference with individual liberty).
According to the testimony of Sergeant
Mangelson and Trooper Howard, the roadblock in the present case was of an "allpurpose" variety. All vehicles except
trucks were checked for licenses, registration, equipment problems, driver sobriety,
and signs of illicit drugs, without any suspicion of wrongdoing. The trial court, focusing on the last purpose, performed a
balancing test as described above. It held
that "a history of escalating drug traffic
along this stretch of Interstate 15 as a
result of other arrests, tends to legitimize
the public interest in predetermined check
points, systematically pursued by officers
to minimize the burden to individual citizens without discretion to engage in random roving stops."8 Without passing
judgment on the accuracy of the trial
court's balancing, we believe that analysis
was premature and therefore erroneous.
[5,6] As we read Sitz, MartinezFuerte, and Brown, a fourth amendment
balancing test applies to warrantless seizures that, if not based upon articulable
suspicion of an individuaJ=-^jtttt$2 be carried
out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99
S.Ct. at 2640 (emphasis added). Additionally, such a plan should be developed by
"politically accountable officials" with a
"unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers."
Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2487. Those officials, and
not the courts, are responsible for performing the initial balancing between the fourth
amendment and the interests served by the
plan. Id. While the Sitz sobriety checkpoint met these requirements, the roadblock used here did not.
No explicit plan, beyond a determination
that all vehicles other than large trucks
There was no finding as to the actual efficacy of
the roadblock in meeting the public purposes
described by the officers or the more specific
purposes identified by the court.
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were to be stopped, governed this roadblock.9 Nor does it appear that Sergeant
Mangelson or the lieutenant who gave him
permission to conduct the roadblock are
politically accountable officials as contemplated in Sitz.10 The process by which the
roadblock was authorized also lacked features of political accountability that were
arguably present in Sitz: the Sitz roadblock was authorized pursuant to careful
advance study that included non-police public officials, while authority for this roadblock arose solely within a police agency.
Finally, there is no indication that the authorization process here involved any balancing of fourth amendment interests and
law enforcement interests, or an assessment of the effectiveness of the roadblock
in meeting those interests. Instead, the
lack of any written guidelines arising from
the authorization process strongly suggests that no such analysis took place.
The requirement of explicit guidelines,
developed in a politically accountable manner that includes balancing of the relevant
concerns, is, under Sitz, a prerequisite to
any judicial balancing analysis of a suspicionless roadblock. l] After-the-fact judicial
balancing of the interests implicated by
9. While we understand that allowing large
trucks to bypass the roadblock may be necessary for safetyJs sake, we wonder about the
implications of this procedure for effective drug
interdiction. The procedure seems to invite
drug traffickers to transport their contraband in
large trucks, and possibly relatively massive
quantities, to avoid detection.
10. Compare United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d
1389 (10th Cir.1987), upholding the constitutionality of a roadblock for the purpose of checking
driver's licenses, vehicle registration, and insurance, pursuant only to the permission of a state
police supervisor. Corral does not cite Brown s
requirement, adopted in Sitz, of a plan explicitly
limiting officer discretion. In view of the reiteration of that requirement we find in Sitz. we
do not accept Corrals implication that supervisory permission to conduct a roadblock constitutes an adequate "plan."
Corral was cited in United States v. McFayden,
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989), which, in turn,
was relied on by the trial court in holding the
roadblock in this case constitutional. McFayden
involved "traffic control" roadblocks set up to
deal with traffic congestion associated with
street level drug trafficking. The McFayden
roadblocks were found to pass the reasonableness balancing test of Brown. Those road-

such a roadblock cannot make it constitutionally proper. Therefore, we hold that
the roadblock in which Sims was detained
violated the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.12
Utah Constitution

Article /, Section 14.

The Sitz emphasis on roadblock guidelines stresses the principle that when police
operations interfere with fourth amendment interests, "the discretion of the official in the field [must] be circumscribed, at
least to some extent." Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391,
1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (citations omitted). Sitz implicitly places both guideline
development and the decision to utilize suspicionless roadblocks in the first place in
the tends of "politically accountable" officials. We view roadblock authorization
and guideline development as separate
steps, however. The initial decision to permit suspicionless roadblocks is especially
critical, and requires a higher degree of
political accountability than the guideline
development step. Sims argues that the
lack of statutory authority renders suspicionless roadblocks improper under the
blocks, again in contrast to the present situation, were carried out pursuant to a coordinated
plan developed by five District of Columbia police districts.
11. A similar conclusion might well be reached
by viewing the roadblock as an "administrative
search." Supreme Court cases dealing with
such searches have focused on the balance between the need for such searches and the fourth
amendment values implicated by such searches.
However, the cases also involved situations
where the challenged search was, at least arguably, authorized by statute or ordinance. See
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States. 397
U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (federal statute); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)
(city housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967)
(city building code).
12. Our uncritical treatment of Sitz and other
federal cases should not be taken as approval of
the analysis employed, or result reached, in
these cases. We merely accede to the preeminent position of the United States Supreme
Court in construing the United States Constitution.
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Utah Constitution. As regards the initial
authority to permit such roadblocks, we
agree.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution is virtually identical to the fourth
amendment. Like its federal counterpart,
it consists of a "reasonableness" clause
and a "warrant" clause:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, decrying
the United States Supreme CourtV4'vacillation between the warrant approach and the
reasonableness approach" regarding automobile searches, id. at 469, reaffirmed its
commitment to the warrant approach under
our constitution, stating that "[warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before a warrant can be obtained." Id. at 470 (quoting State v. Ckristensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984)).
In Larocco, a car theft suspect's expectation of privacy in the interior of the subject
car, parked unattended and unlocked on a
public street, triggered the application of
article I, section 14. 794 P.2d at 468-69.
Police officers' warrantless opening of the
car's door to view the vehicle identification
number on the doorjamb was found to constitute1 a search subject to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement. The
search was then held improper under article I, section 14, because there was no
threat that the car would disappear before
13. Our analysis under the Utah Constitution is
limited to the need for legislative authorization.
We note, however, that Justice Durham's opinion in Larocco, requires both probable cause
and exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search and seizure under article I, section
14, which would seem to prohibit this roadblock
and others. However, Larocco was a divided
decision, with Justice Zimmerman concurring,
Justice Stewart concurring in result only, and
Justices Hall and Howe dissenting. The final

a warrant could be obtained to look inside
it. The court held that such "exigent circumstances" to support a warrantless
search did not exist where the car was not
en route away from the officers' jurisdiction and the suspect had not been alerted to
police interest in it. Id. at 470-71.
Under article I, section 14 our supreme
court applies a "warrants whenever possible" policy to motor vehicle searches and
seizures. Id. This policy is consistent with
one fundamental purpose of constitutional
search and seizure limits: the interposition
of neutral authority between police seeking
evidence of crimes and the citizens from
whom such evidence is sought.13
In the usual non-exigent circumstances
search and seizure scenario, the judicial
branch, through a magistrate, serves as
the neutral authority that issues or denies
a warrant to perform a search or seizure.
The warrant is issued only when probable
cause exists. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah
Const, art. I, § 14. Our state legislature,
however, has also served as a neutral authority between our police and our citizens,
in authorizing certain seizures upon less
than probable cause.
As already noted, our legislature has followed the courts' lead in authorizing brief
warrantless stops of individuals and motor
vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.14
Also as noted, the legislature has acted
independently in authorizing ports of entry,
as well as fish and game checkpoints.
These operations, supported by neither
warrants nor any level of individualized
suspicion, clearly implicate article I, section
14 of our constitution.
From an operational standpoint, ports of
entry and fish and game checkpoints closely resemble the roadblock that was converdict for Utah roadblocks is, therefore, unknown.
14. Arguably, legislative enactment of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 77-7-15 (1990) and 41-l-17(c) (1988)
may reflect a determination by our legislature
to not simply ratify judicial expansion of police
power by silent acquiescence, but to determine
through the political process whether such expansion is to become a part of Utah's law.
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ducted in this case, in that all large trucks,
or all vehicles used by hunters, respectively are submitted to official inspections.
However, in authorizing these operations,
our legislature has, presumably, weighed
the need for such suspicionless inspections
against their intrusion upon individual liberty,15 a process analogous to that performed by a magistrate in the issuance of a
warrant. A high degree of political accountability for the institution of these
practices can also be presumed, in that
representatives of truckers, hunters, law
enforcement, and the citizenry at large all
very likely played a part in passing the
relevant statutes.
In each case of legislation authorizing
specific types of checkpoints or stops of
persons or vehicles, with or without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the citizens of this state have acted through their
elected representatives. Therefore, the collective will of the people is expressed and,
furthermore, the people have notice of duly
authorized police activity.
In stark contrast, the roadblock conducted in this case was authorized solely by
police officers, the very people whose behavior article I, section 14 is intended to
limit. No non-law enforcement officials
took part in the decision to set up the
roadblock. Leaving the initial decision to
conduct such operations in police hands ere-,
ates a scheme that is both unrealistic and
constitutionally untenable.
[7] We believe that legislative authorization of ports of entry and fish and game
checkpoints, like the issuance of a judicial
warrant, triggers at least some presumption that these law enforcement practices
are constitutionally permissible. Because
the roadblock in this case had neither form
15. Indeed, in the case of port of entry stops, the
legislature appears to have weighed liberty concerns with some care. Vehicles normally subject to these stops are exempted from stopping if
doing so would increase their one-way trip distance by more than three miles or five percent.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-19.4(1) and (3) (Supp.
1990).
16. In Pimental v. Dep't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348
(R.I.1989), and Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348
Pa^uper. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985), the Rhode
Utah Rep 803-609 P 2d—13

of authorization, it was entitled to no such
presumption. Both warrants and statutes
originate outside the executive branch,
serving to check abuses of that branch's
law enforcement power. Consistent with
our supreme court's emphasis on the warrant requirement, then, we hold that suspicionless, investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks, conducted without legislative authorization, are per se unconstitutional under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
In requiring legislative authority as a
prerequisite to the use of suspicionless investigatory roadblocks, we join two other
western states that have similarly construed their constitutions. See, e.g., State
v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057
(1988); Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97,
743 P.2d 692 (1987).16 At least one other
state has established the same standard
under the fourth amendment. State v.
Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.App.1984). This
approach is particularly appropriate where
a proposed police practice will, as here,
affect everyone traveling our state's highways. Because of its close ties to the
citizens whose rights will be affected, the
minimum necessary political accountability
for such practices lies, at the outset, with
our legislature.
Our holding that article I, section 14 prohibits suspicionless investigative roadblocks without legislative authority, in effect, requires the legislature to perform the
Sitz -type balancing function if and when it
decides to consider the authorization of
such roadblocks. Judicial balancing of the
interests implicated by such roadblocks,
then, will need to occur only if and when
the legislature, upon performing such balancing itself, decides to authorize them.17
Island Supreme Court and the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional under their state constitutions without considering whether such practices could be
valid if statutorily authorized.
17. We note that the factors to be considered in
performing such balancing are myriad, complex, and subject to debate. See, e.g., Sitz and
dissenting opinions of Brennan and Stevens, JJ.;
Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d at 710-11 (appendix); see also Davis & Wallentine, A Model
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We, unlike our colleague in his concurringI
opinion, prefer that the legislature an-nounce its view of public policy and thei
philosophy of Utah's citizenry as regards5
roadblocks, prior to the court applying constitutional analysis to the legislature's>
product.18
We also emphasize that our holding oni
the state constitutionality of the roadblock;
in which Sims was stopped is limited in its\
application to similar, non-emergency situations. It is not intended to apply to emergency roadblocks that might, for example,
be used to apprehend a fleeing felon. Nor
do we intend to impede any existing authority to conduct roadblocks for traffic•
control purposes. Any constitutional challenge to these types of traffic stops awaits
another day. It is the suspicionless, investigative, non-emergency roadblock, conducted in the absence of legislative authority, that we hold to be unconstitutional.
ATTENUATION OF CONSENT FROM
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK
Sims argues that there was insufficient
attenuation between his detention and the
consent he gave to search his vehicle to
purge the taint of the illegality of the detention. He does not claim that his consent
was coerced from him and was therefore
involuntary. Rather, he argues that because there were no intervening circumstances between the detention and the consent, the consent was the fruit of the illegal detention, and, therefore, evidence
seized pursuant to his consent should have
been ordered suppressed. Sims did not
make this argument in the trial court.
[8,9] Normally, "where a defendant
fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in
the trial court, an appellate court will not
for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety
Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 B.Y.UJ.Pub.L. 357
(1989). Political and economic considerations
that are the particular province of the legislature may also come into play: Utah's economy
benefits greatly from tourism, and the state is
also currently attempting to attract the Winter
Olympic Games. Our legislators may well wish
to consider the possible impact of suspicionless
roadblocks upon visitors to our state.

consider that ground on appeal." State v
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); see
also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n< 2
(Utah Ct.App.1990); Utah R.Crim.P. 12.
Unless a ground for suppression is " u n .
known or unavailable" to a defendant at
the time a suppression motion is filed, the
right to challenge the admission of evidence on that ground is waived. State v.
Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981). Here,
however, because our then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced
search consent, by itself, purged the taint
of a primary illegality, Sims' non-attenuation argument was unavailable to him in
the trial court and would have been pointless to assert. See State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah CtApp.1988). Therefore, it is proper to address that argument
now.
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing
this court's holding in State v. Arroyo, 770
P.2d 153, 155-56 (Utah Ct.App.1989), held
that, to be constitutionally valid, a search
consent following illegal police behavior
must be both non-coerced and not arrived
at by exploitation of the primary police
illegality. Factors used to evaluate the
non-exploitation or attenuation element are
derived from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975),
which involved a confession obtained from
a criminal suspect after his illegal arrest
They include the temporal proximity of the
primary illegality and the granting of consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 n. 4 (citing
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at
2261-62, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 1987)).
18. It may be that lifestyle in the western states
promotes a greater expectation of privacy in our
automobiles than in other states or in the United States Supreme Court's enunciation of the
"automobile exception" under the fourth
amendment. See California v. Carney, 471 VS.
386, 105 S.Ct. 2066. 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).

STATE v. SIMS

Utah 151

Cite as 808 TJA 141 (Utah App. 1991)

[10] The Arroyo case was remanded to
the trial court for fact finding on the issue
of whether the defendant's consent to
search his vehicle was attenuated from or
an exploitation of his illegal stop. Because
the burden is on the State to show that
evidence obtained following illegal police
conduct is attenuated from the illegality,
Broum, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262,
and because the attenuation issue was not
presented to the trial court, a remand to
examine the attenuation factors has been
suggested here. We find, however, that
the record now before us contains "sufficient detail and depth" to allow us to determine the issue as a matter of law. See id.
Regarding the temporal proximity factor,
the record demonstrates a very short time
span between Sims' stop in the roadblock
and Trooper Howard's request to search
his automobile. The trooper had but a
brief conversation with Sims, regarding his
license and registration, his trip itinerary,
and possession of alcohol, guns, or contraband, before asking for consent to search
his car. The consent was obtained within
minutes of the illegal stop, and not even
under our clear error standard of review
could the trial court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent to
attenuate the relationship between the
two.19
Nor does the record reveal any possibility of intervening circumstances between
the illegal stop and Sims' grant of consent
to the search. Such circumstances must be
independent of the primary illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91. Here, Trooper
Howard's request for consent to search
Sims' sedan was based upon the smell of
alcohol, the sight of the open liquor bottle
in the sedan, and Sims' admission, uneventful since the bottle was in obvious
view, that he was carrying alcohol. Howard's opportunity to make these observa19. We note that in Brown, an interval of less
than two hours between an illegal arrest and the
obtaining of an incriminating statement from
the arrestee was viewed as insufficient to attenuate the statement from the arrest. 422 U.S. at
604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262.
20. Additionally, Trooper Howard testified that,
once the open container was discovered, Sims

tions and to question Sims, however, depended entirely on the illegal roadblock.
Neither Sims' driving nor the external appearance of his vehicle justified stopping
him. Nothing occurred which could have
reasonably made him feel free to proceed
on his journey at any time between the
moment of his stop and the discoveries that
prompted the trooper's request for consent
to search his vehicle.20 Sims did not spontaneously volunteer his consent, but gave it
only when asked. Sims' consent, then,
arose from an unbroken chain of events
that began with the illegal roadblock.
The final factor in the attenuation analysis is an examination of the purpose and
flagrancy of the primary police illegality.
Here, this factor, unlike the first two, appears unrelated to the question of whether
a search consent flowed from, i.e., was an
exploitation of, the illegal police conduct.21
Instead, it appears to be an alternative
approach, inviting us to overlook unconstitutional police conduct that serves good
purposes and is not too flagrant.
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testified at some length about their expertise in
drug interdiction, and the trial court treated the roadblock as if that was its primary
purpose. However noble this purpose
might be, it was pursued by an unauthorized means. The troopers each had years
of law enforcement experience, and can
properly be charged with awareness that
their action was not authorized by law.
"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 573, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to
twelve law officers to staff the roadblock
may have also left distant parts of the
largely rural jurisdiction with delayed police assistance in the event of need. Thus,
was, in fact, not free to leave, but was subject to
citation and to field sobriety testing.
21. By contrast, in Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court seems to have regarded an illegal arrest,
that appeared "calculated to cause surprise,
fright, and confusion," 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct.
at 2262, as a causative factor producing the
arrestee's subsequent incriminating statements.
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although it does not appear that the officers behaved abusively toward those
stopped at the roadblock, this does not correct the constitutional violation.
In sum, the record demonstrates that
Sims' consent to search his vehicle was
arrived at by exploitation of the illegal
roadblock. Accordingly, that consent was
invalid. Because the exclusionary rule applies to violations of both the fourth
amendment and article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution, State v. Larocco, 794
P.2d 460, 471-73 (Utah 1990), all evidence
obtained under that consent must be suppressed.

PROBABLE CAUSE TO
CONTINUE SEARCH
Troopers Howard and Mangelson believed that the discovery of marijuana in
Sims' sedan under the consent search gave
them probable cause to continue searching
after consent was withdrawn. However,
because the initial consent was invalid, any
probable cause found while searching under that consent was also invalid. Absent
probable cause to search the sedan without
Sims' consent, we need not reach the issue
of whether exigent circumstances existed
to make the warrant requirement inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
Sims' conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
trial court for proceedings in accord with
this opinion.
JACKSON, J., concurs.
ORME, Judge (concurring specially):
While I otherwise concur fully in the
court's opinion, I have two difficulties with
the discussion treating the roadblock under
article I, section 14, of the Utah Constitution. First, if the roadblock cannot even be
validated under the questionable "balancing" approach of Michigan v. Sitz, —
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412
(1990), see, e.g., id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), we have no need to examine

whether it might be additionally invalid under the state constitution. Second, and
more importantly, I am not enthusiastic
about suggesting that the legislature, any
more than the courts or the police, should
be about the business of balancing away
important constitutional protections that
safeguard all of us so that law enforcement can more readily catch an occasional
law-breaker. The citizen's right to be free
from police intrusion in the total absence of
even the least suspicion of wrong-doing
should simply not be at the mercy of the
legislature's determination of how tourism
or our hopes for the Olympics might somehow be adversely impacted by one law enforcement technique or another.
If it were necessary to reach the state
constitutional issue in this case, i.e., if the
roadblock passed muster under the federal
constitution, I would be more inclined to
solidify long-standing constitutional precepts as at the core of article I, section 14,
than to borrow the troublesome "balancing" approach embraced in Sitz, adopt
some variation of that approach, and begin
a journey down that nebulous path. Cf.
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah
1990) (state constitutional analysis employed "to simplify . . . the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily
followed by the police and the courts and,
at the same time, provide the public with
consistent and predictable protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures"). I would probably prefer to hold
that the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), uniformly applied by Utah courts, is a matter
of Utah constitutional law that simply may
not be balanced away by any branch of our
government and that is not amenable to a
roadblock exception.
Under established Utah decisional law, in
the absence of any individualized suspicion,
only a level one stop is permitted. E.g.,
State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah
Ct.App.1990); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d
537, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah CtApp.
1987). A level one stop is a purely voluntary encounter. Id. And one does not lose
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the right to decline to participate in a level
Burt A. GOTTFREDSON, Petitioner,
one encounter simply because one chooses
to drive rather than to walk. See State v.
v.
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah CtApp.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT
1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328
BOARD, Respondent.
(Utah CtApp. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). See
No. 900255-CA.
also, Delaware v. Prowse, 440 U.S. 648,
Court of Appeals of Utah.
663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660
(1979) (persons do not lose the protections
March 20, 1991.
of fourth amendment "when they step
from the sidewalk into their automobiles");
State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491, 494
Worker's petition to withdraw his re(Utah CtApp. 1990).
tirement application was denied by the
If, as seems clear, the police cannot re- State Retirement Board, and worker apquire every pedestrian on a stretch of side- pealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J.,
walk to stop and answer police inquiries, I held that: (1) worker's request to cancel his
am hard-pressed to see how they can stop application was untimely, and (2) Board had
every car on a stretch of the interstate no affirmative duty to inform worker of
highway and require the driver to answer proposed legislation which, if passed, could
inquiries. In my view, the only roadblock substantially affect his benefits.
that is sure to pass state constitutional
Affirmed.
muster is one which would qualify as a
level-one stop. Cf. Little v. State, 300 Md.
485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1989) (roadblock 1. Administrative Law and Procedure
upheld where motorists avoiding roadblock
<s=*800
or otherwise refusing to cooperate not deStandard of review on appeal from fitained). I see no constitutional problem nal agency action dealing with statutory
with a roadside police checkpoint an- interpretation presents issue of law, and
nounced by a sign on the freeway, "Police
Court of Appeals therefore applies correcRoadblock Next Exit. Your Cooperation in
tion-of-error standard, in which it extends
Answering Police Inquiries Appreciated."
no deference to agency's conclusions.
Most drivers would stop, even though they
could not be required to, just as most pe- 2. States <s=>64.1(3)
destrians will stop and respond to police
Where worker established on his reinquiries on the sidewalk. But on neither tirement application his retirement date,
medium of travel can one suspected of which date also determined when his benenothing illegal whatsoever be compelled to fits would start to accrue, no alteration,
do so.
addition, or cancellation of his benefits
could be made after that date; thus, because his request to cancel his application
was not made until after that date, his
request was properly refused. U.C.A.1953,
( o f HYNUMMRSYSTEM>
49-1-603(1).
3. States ®=>64.1(3)
Retirement Board had no affirmative
duty to inform worker, who had filed his
retirement application, of proposed legislation which, if passed, could substantially
affect his benefits. U.C.A.1953, 49-1603(1).
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Louie E. SIMS, Petitioner,
v.
COLLECTION DIVISION OF the UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent
No. 900324.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 22, 1992.
Driver sought review of order of state
Tax Commission affirming a tax and penalty assessment under the Illegal Drug
Stamp Tax Act The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) authority for a suspicionless investigatory roadblock could not
be implied from the broad statutory authority of police to preserve the peace and to
make all lawful arrests; (2) driver's consent to a search of his automobile and
trunk did not purge evidence of the taint of
illegality after driver had been stopped by
an unconstitutional roadblock and police
had discovered cocaine and marijuana during search; and (3) civil tax proceeding
would be characterized as quasi-criminal so
thaf the exclusionary rule would apply to
exclude illegally obtained evidence from
the drug stamp proceedings.
Reversed.
Stewart, J., filed opinion concurring in
the result
Howe, Associate CJ., filed dissenting
opinion in which Hall, CJ., concurred.
1. Arrest «=*3.5(6)
Authority for suspicionless investigatory roadblocks could not be implied from
broad statutory authority of police to preserve peace and make all lawful arrests,
even though express statutory authority
existed for roadblocks for traffic control
purposes, for port of entry purposes, and
to enforce fish and game laws. (Per Durham, J., with one Justice concurring and
one Justice concurring in the result) Const
Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4;
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-914, 17-22-2, 23-20-19,
27-12-19, 77-23-101 to 77-2&-105.

2. Searches and Seizures <s=>182
Factors to determine whether consent
to search is lawfully obtained following
initial misconduct are whether consent was
voluntary and whether consent was obtained by exploitation of prior illegality.
(Per Durham, J., with one Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the result) Const Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 4.
3. Searches and Seizures s=>182
Factors to be considered in determining whether primary illegality of ^arch is
exploited to obtain consent are, temporal
proximity of illegal seizure and consent,
presence of intervening circumstances, purpose and iflagrancy of official misconduct,
whether illegal seizure brought about police observation of particular object they
sought consent to search, whether consent
was volunteered rather than requested by
detaining officers, whether party searched
was made aware of ability to refuse consent and prevent immediate search, and
whether police purpose underlying illegality was to obtain consent (Per Durham, J.,
with one Justice concurring and one Justice
concurring in the result) Const. Art. 1,
§ 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
4. Searches and Seizures <s=>182
Driver's consent to search of automobile and trunk did not purge evidence of
taint of illegality after driver was stopped
by unconstitutional suspicionless investigatory roadblock and police discovered cocaine and marijuana during search; officer's request for consent was based upon
observations that were direct result of illegal stop, consent was closely related in
time to initial stop with no intervening circumstances, and driver was not told that he
could decline to consent. (Per Durham, J.,
with one Justice concurring and one Justice
concurring in the result.) Const. Art. 1,
§ 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Taxation e=>845
Civil proceeding under Illegal Drug
Stamp Tax Act should be characterized as
quasi-criminal so that exclusionary rule applies to exclude illegally obtained evidence;
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statute seeks to punish and deter those in
possession of illegal drugs, enforcement is
inextricably connected with proof of criminal activity by requiring possessors of illegal drugs to purchase drug stamps and
affix them to drugs, and application of
exclusionary rule should provide deterrent
to unconstitutional seizures by law enforcement entities who receive money collected
under statute. (Per Durham, J., with one
Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the result) U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101
to 5&-19-107, 59-19-105(1), (6), (6)(a)(ii), 5919-106(1); Omst Art 1, § 14.
6. Evidence <$=>154
Illegally seized evidence must be excluded under State Constitution if proceeding in which exclusion is sought is quasicriminal in nature or if there is particularized need for deterrence to restrain improper law enforcement activities, despite
whether proceeding in question is labeled
civil or criminal in nature. (Per Durham,
J., with one Justice concurring and one
Justice concurring in the result.) Const.
Art. 1, § 14.
R. Paul Van Dam, Leon A. Dever, John
C. McCarrey, Salt Lake City, for Tax
Com'n.
G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for Sims.
DURHAM, Justice:
Petitioner Louie E. Sims seeks review of
a formal order of the Utah State Tax Commission ("the Commission") affirming a tax
and penalty assessment under the Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act ("the Act"). Utah
Code Ann. §§ 5^-19-101 to -107. We reverse the decision of the Commission and
vacate the tax and penalty assessed.
On July 27, 1988, the Utah Highway
Patrol and the Juab County Sheriffs Department set up a roadblock on Interstate
Highway 15 approximately two miles outside of Nephi, Utah. When Sims' car was
stopped at the roadblock, the officers observed an open container of alcohol in the
back seat area. Sims was asked to exit the
car, at which time he consented to a search
of the interior. There, the officers discov-

ered the remnants of one or two marijuana
cigarettes. Sims then consented to a
search of the trunk. When the latter
search revealed two small plastic bags containing marijuana, Sims stated that he
wanted the search stopped. Asserting that
they had probable cause to continue, the
officers inspected the spare tire well, uncovering a kilogram brick of cocaine. Sims
was then arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute.
Under the Act, anyone who purchases,
acquires, transports, or imports illegal
drugs into the state must pay a tax and
affix drug tax stamps to the drugs. Utah
Code Ann. § 59-19-105(1). The required
stamps were not attached to or contained
with the cocaine and marijuana found in
Sims' car. On August 30, 1988, Sims was
served with a notice and demand for payment of an illegal drug stamp tax and a
corresponding penalty. The tax, assessed
pursuant to section 59-19-103 of the Act,
and the penalty, under section 59-19-106(1)
of the Act, total almost $400,000.
Upon being served with notice of the tax
and penalty, Sims filed a petition for redetermination with the Commission. He argued, among other things, that the roadblock stop was an unconstitutional seizure
and that the evidence seized pursuant to it
should, under the exclusionary rule, be excluded from the tax proceeding. Because
the Commission held that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to proceedings under
the Act, it did not reach the question of
whether the roadblock stop was constitutional. The State did not address the issue
of the constitutionality of the roadblock
stop in either its brief to the Commission or
its brief to this court. Rather, the State
asks us to decide the case solely on the
basis of the exclusionary rule.
We believe that it would be irresponsible
for us to simply assume that the roadblock
was unconstitutional without analysis.
Sims has preserved the issue on appeal,
and although the Utah Court of Appeals
has addressed the question of suspicionless
roadblock stops a number of times, see
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ized suspicion of wrongdoing to establish
probable cause, and because roadblocks are
planned in advance, no exigent circumstances justify an immediate search. The
requirement that a disinterested party review and approve the need to search was
designed to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference with individual privacy
and personal security and to guarantee
that a decision to search private property is
justified by a reasonable governmental interest Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528, 539, 87 S.Ct 1727, 1730,
1736, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).
The State argues in this case that suspicionless investigatory roadblocks are authorized by statute. We do not reach the
question of whether such statutory authorization could constitutionally be accomplished by the legislature, because we conclude that no such authorization has been
attempted.
Although certain roadblocks are authorized by statute,4 at the time of the search
in question Utah law did not expressly authorize suspicionless investigatory roadblocks.8 A number of statutory provisions
grant law enforcement agencies and offi4. There is statutory authorization to stop and
inspect all large vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock at ports of entry for, among other
things, dnver qualifications, registration, tax
payments, size and weight, and safety. Utah
Code Ann. § 27-12-19. Moreover, the Division
of Wildlife is given authority to conduct roadblocks to enforce the fish and game laws. Id.
§ 25-20-19.
5. We note, however, that in 1992 the legislature
authorized the use of administrative traffic
checkpoints under prescribed circumstances.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-101 to -105.
*• Sheriffs and their deputies are granted authority to preserve the peace and make all lawful
arrests. Utah Code Ann. § 17-22-2. Municipal
police officers are granted authority "at all
times to preserve the public peace, prevent
Crime, detect and arrest offenders, ... protect
persons and property, remove nuisances existing in the public streets, roads and highways,
enforce every law relating to the suppression of
offenses and perform all duties required of
them by ordinance or resolution." Id. § 10-3914.
7. On this point, we agree with the following
statement of the Oregon Supreme Court
*[S]ome procedures may invade the personal

cers general police powers to provide for
public safety and welfare.* Other states
have inferred legislative authority to conduct roadblocks from such statutory grants
of general police powers. See, e.g.t People
v. Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 24 Ill.Dec.
924, 929-30, 386 N.E.2d 128, 133-54, cert
denied, 444 U.S. 968, 100 S.Ct 459, 62
L.Ed.2d 382 (1979). Because of the primacy in Utah of the warrant requirement and
the grave potential for injury to individuals' constitutional interests, however, we
decline to infer authority for suspicionless
investigatory stops from broad statutory
directives.7 No authority to conduct suspicionless investigatory roadblocks of the
type conducted here exists; hence, thenuse is patently unlawful. Whether constitutionally sufficient standards and guidelines could be incorporated in statutory
form is a question we leave for future
consideration.
[2,3] In conjunction with the question
of the legality of the roadblock in this case,
we must address the question of whether
Sims' subsequent consent to a search of his
car alleviates the taint of the prior illegal
seizure.8 In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684
freedoms protected from government interference by the constitution. Roadblocks are seizures of the person, possibly to be followed by a
search of the person or the person's effects. For
this reason, the authority to conduct roadblocks
cannot be implied." Nelson v. Lane County, 304
Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692, 695 (1987); accord State v.
Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988);
State
v.
Smith,
674
P.2d
562
(Okla.Crim.App.1984). Moreover, in the existing statutes, the Utah Legislature has provided
that suspicion of wrongdoing is a condition precedent for authority to stop a person or vehicle.
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-105(8)(b), 77-7-15.
This serves as additional support for our rejecuon of implicit statutory authority for mvestigatory suspicioniess roadblocks.
8. Two factors determine whether a consent to
search is lawfully obtained following initial misconduct: (1) whether the consent was voluntary, and (2) whether the consent was obtained
by exploitation of the prior illegality. State v.
Arroyo, 796 P^d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). Here,
there is no allegation that the consent was
coerced from Sims or that it was otherwise
obtained involuntarily. Our discussion focuses,
therefore, on the second factor, whether the
prior illegality was exploited to obtain the concededly voluntary consent.
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Commission), or essentially coextensive.
See Ex Parte Caffie, 516 So.2d 831, 837
(Ala.1987) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in
probation revocation hearing under both
federal and state constitutions because
state constitution "protects similar, if not
identical, interests" to Fourth Amendment
of United States Constitution). Only a few
states have analyzed the scope of the rule
separate and apart from the federal constitution and federal case law.
Developments in Oregon suggest that its
exclusionary rule applies to civil as well as
criminal proceedings. Several recent cases
have characterized the purpose of the Oregon exclusionary rule as restoring a defendant's personal right rather than as deterring unlawful police conduct State v.
Tanner, 304 Or. 312, 745 P.2d 757, 758
(1987); State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 666
P.2d 802, 809 (1983); see also Ronald W.
Messerly, Development in the Law, Development of the Right to Exclude Illegally
Seized Evidence in Oregon under Article
I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, 25
Willamette LRev. 697, 709 n. 82 (1989).
Another scholar has argued that a per se
application of the exclusionary rule might
be appropriate under the Oregon Constitution regardless of the nature (civil or criminal) of the proceeding in which the illegally
seized evidence is sought to be admitted.
See H. Lee Cook, Comment, The Oregon
Variation of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Proceedings, 65 Or.L.Rev. 681, 683 (1986).
In 1982, the voters of California added
section 28(d) to article I of the California
Constitution, providing that relevant evidence shall not be excluded from any criminal proceeding. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court ruled that evidence
must still be excluded as required by the

federal constitution and, moreover, that the
constitutional amendment did not affect the
precedent in that state regarding the applicability of the exclusionary rule to certain
civil proceedings. In re Lance W., 37
Cal.3d 873, 210 CaLRptr. 631, 643-44, 694
P.2d 744, 75G-57 (1985)." The Lance court
considered the applicability of the rule to
civil proceedings in terms of the state constitution, reaching the conclusion that under the California Constitution, the exclusionary rule extends only to quasi-criminal
proceedings, not to other civil proceedings.
Id 210 CaLRptr. at 643, 694 P.2d at 756;
accord Governing Bd, v. Metcalf 36 Cal.
App.3d 546, 111 CaLRptr. 724 (1974) (evidence of lewd acts by a schoolteacher obtained in violation of California and federal
constitutions admissible in administrative
hearing to revoke teaching license).
In Whisenhunt v. State, 746 P.2d 1298
(Alaska 1987), the Alaska Supreme Court
extended the application of the exclusionary rule to a civil license revocation proceeding. It is not entirely clear from the
opinion whether the Alaska court based its
decision exclusively on state law or on both
federal and state law. In addition to considering the federally accepted policy of
deterrence, the Alaska court relied on its
own state policy of "fundamental fairness." Id. at 1300. Because this is not a
policy relied on by the federal courts when
applying the exclusionary rule to noncriminal proceedings, it is reasonable to conclude that the Alaska court was articulating state law.
This court first addressed the question of
a state exclusionary rule in Larocco, where
we expressly held that "the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary
consequence of police violations of article I,
section 14" of the Utah Constitution. 794

12. At first, the California court extended the
exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings, reasoning that they were criminal in nature. See
People v. One I960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cai2d 92,
41 CaLRptr. 290, 293. 396 P.2d 706, 709 (1964).
In People v. Moore, 69 CaUd 674, 72 CaLRptr.
800, 805, 446 P.2d 800, 805 (1968), overruled on
other grounds, People v. Thomas, 19 Cal3d 630,
139 CalJRptr. 594, 600 n. 8, 566 P.2d 228, 234 n.
8 (1977), the court held that evidence illegally
seized under the Fourth Amendment was inad-

missible in a civil proceeding to commit a narcotic addict because that proceeding was quasicriminal in nature. Later, the court declined to
extend the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings, In re Martinez. 1 Cal.3d 641,
83 CaLRptr. 382, 388, 463 P.2d 734, 740 cert
denied sub nom. Martinez v. Craven, 400 VS.
851,91 S.O. 71, 27 L.Ed.2d 88 (1970), or to state
bar proceedings, Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal.3d
210, 113 CaLRptr. 175, 186, 520 P.2d 991, 1002
(1974).
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TJ2A at 472. In Larocco, the warrantless
opening of an unlocked car door to inspect
a vehicle identification number was held to
constitute an unreasonable search under
that provision of our state constitution.
We held that the trial court had incorrectly
admitted evidence of the vehicle identification number in a criminal trial for car theft.
The Larocco decision expressly reserved
the question of the nature and scope of the
exclusionary rule under the state constitution, holding only that it exists. Id at 473.
We now extend the state exclusionary rule
to proceedings under the Illegal Drug
Stamp Tax Act, based on the reasoning
that illegally obtained evidence should be
excluded from a civil proceeding if the proceeding is in effect criminal or if the exclusion is necessary to deter future unconstitutional searches. Our treatment of the
exclusionary rule in this case is based solely on state law. Federal law cited is relied
upon only for its persuasive value.
Because of the difference in potential
penalties, the criminal defendant is often
afforded greater protection than the civil
defendant. See generally United States v.
One Assortment of Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 358-59, 104 S.Ct 1099, 1103, 79
L.Ed.2d 361 (1S84) (based on difference in
relative burdens of proof in criminal and
civil actions, neither collateral estoppel nor
double jeopardy bars a civil remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following acquittal on related criminal charges). Where
the aims and objectives of a civil penalty
are closely aligned with those of the criminal law, however, the protections afforded
by the criminal law ought to be extended to
the quasi-criminal proceeding. For this
reason, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the federal exclusionary rule to
include forfeiture proceedings in One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170
(1965), stating, "[A] forfeiture proceeding
is quasi-criminal in character. Its object,
like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for
the commission of an offense against the
law." Id. at 700, 85 S.Ct at 1250.
13. The tax and penalty assessed against Sims in
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Although forfeiture proceedings are frequently cited as the prototype, other kinds
of civil proceedings have been characterized as quasi-criminal. See Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C.Cir.1966) (employee discharge hearing); Iowa v. Union
Aspfralt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F.Supp. 391,
407 (S.D.Iowa 1968) (antitrust proceeding),
affd as to exclusionary rule issue sub
nom Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d
1171 (8th Cir.1969); United States v.
Blank, 261 F.Supp. 180, 184 (N.D.Ohio
1966) (wagering excise tax assessment proceeding); Rinderknecht v. Maricopa
County Employees Merit Sys., 21 Ariz.
App. 419, 520 P.2d 332, 334-35 (employee
discharge hearing), vacated after settlement, 111 Ariz. 174, 526 P.2d 713 (1974);
People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 805, 446 P.2d 800, 805 (1968)
(proceeding to commit narcotic addict),
overruled on other grounds, People v.
Thomas, 19 Cal.3d 630, 139 Cal.Rptr. 594,
600 n. 8, 566 P.2d 228, 234 n. 8 (1977);
Finns Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor
Authority, 2A N.Y.2d 647, 301 N.Y.S.2d
584, 588, 249 N.E.2d 440, 443 (administrative proceedings to suspend or cancel liquor
licenses), cert denied, 396 U.S. 840, 90
S.Ct 103, 24 L.Ed.2d 91 (1969). The civil
tax proceeding at issue in this case should
be included in that group.
The Act at issue in this case is similar to
the criminal law in its objectives. It seeks
to punish and deter those in possession of
illegal drugs. Cf. Deeter v. Smith, 106
Wash.2d 376, 721 P.2d 519, 520-21 (1986)
(forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant
to the state's Uniform Controlled Substances Act "are quasi-criminal in nature
since their purpose is to penalize individuals who participate in the illegal transportation of controlled substances"). The Commission asserts that the objective of the
Act is to raise revenue, but the assessment
scheme and penalty provisions are far too
onerous to justify such a conclusion.18 The
fact that section 59-19-106(1) requires
those who violate the Act to pay a 100
percent penalty in addition to the base tax
reveals that one objective of the Act is to
this case, for example, total almost $400,000.
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punish and deter those in possession of
illegal drugs. The fact that the legislature
has chosen to obtain this result by what it
terms a "tax" and a "penalty" does not
change the character of the result
The quasi-criminal nature of the tax proceeding in this case is further evidenced by
the fact that enforcement of the Act i§
inextricably connected with proof of criminal activity. See Kuntz v. State Highway
Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D.1987)
("[T]he civil and criminal consequences [of
a refusal to take an intoxilyzer test] are so
intermingled that they are not perceptibly
different to a lay person."). Violation of
the Act necessarily involves criminal conduct and a violation of criminal law. Compliance with the Act presupposes the possessor's knowledge of the possession of
illegal drugs and therefore requires a violation of criminal law.14 "It would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to
hold that in the criminal proceeding the
illegally seized evidence is excludable,
while in the [civil] proceeding, requiring the
determination that the criminal law has
been violated, the same evidence would be
admissible." Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at
701, 85JS.Ct at 1251. Given that an essential element of a criminal offense must be
established by either violation of or compliance with the Act, we are convinced that
enforcement proceedings under the Act
must be viewed as quasi-criminal and the
exclusionary rule should therefore apply.
One of the frequently cited purposes of
the exclusionary rule is to deter future
14. In order to comply with the Act, those in
possession of illegal drugs must purchase Utah
Drug Stamps and "affix the official indicia [the
drug stamps] on the ... controlled substances
evidencing the payment of the tax required under this chapter." * Utah Code Ann. § 59-19105(1).
15. In its brief, the State argues that because
section 59-19-105(6) did not become effective
until April 24, 1989, we should not consider its
effect on Sims' case. While it is true that the
amendment was not effective on July 27, 1988,
when the cocaine and marijuana were seized,
nor on August 29, 1988, when the tax and penalty became due and payable, the language of the
statute does not necessarily lead to the conclusion, as the State would assert, that any monies
eventually paid in this case will not be shared

unlawful seizures. See, e.g., United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446, 96 S.Ct 3021,
3028, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, reh'g denied, 429
U.S. 874, 97 S.Ct 196, 60 L.Ed.2d 158
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct 613, 619, 38 L.Ed.2d
561 (1974); Cqffie, 516 So.2d at 832; Pullin, 484 So.2d at 107. In addition to the
general need for protection of individual
rights under article I, section 14, there is a
specialized need for ensuring restraint by
law enforcement officials in connection
with the Act Law enforcement entities
have a particularized interest in the use of
the illegally obtained evidence in the civil
tax proceeding under section 59-19105(6XaXii). That section provides that 60
percent of the taxes, interest, and penalties
collected are to be distributed "to the law
enforcement agency conducting the controlled substance investigation, to be used
and applied by the agency in the continued
enforcement of controlled substance laws."
Id. In view of the financial motivation
given to local law enforcement agencies to
acquire evidence of tax violations, the application of the exclusionary rule to drug
stamp tax proceedings is likely to provide a
significant and substantial additional deterrent to unconstitutional seizures.15 This is
a second and independent reason to apply
the exclusionary rule to proceedings under
the Act
[6] We hold that illegally seized evidence must be excluded under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution where
the proceeding in which exclusion is sought
with law enforcement agencies. The language
of the statute, rather, provides for a sharing of
the amounts "collected" under the Act. This
language implies that such a division might occur on amounts which are assessed prior to the
effective date of the amendment but are not
collected until after that time.
Moreover, deterrence is by definition the discouragement or prevention of future acts. Our
application of the exclusionary rule in this case
obviously cannot deter any unconstitutional seizures that have already occurred. Our purpose
in citing a deterrence rationale is with regard to
future activity. The applicability or inapplicability of section 59-19-105(6) to the specific
facts of this case is therefore not particularly
relevant
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is quasi-criminal in nature or where there is
a particularized need for deterrence to restrain improper law enforcement activities.
This result shall ensue whether the proceeding in question is labelled "civil" or
"criminal/' Both conditions apply in this
case, and we therefore hold that the exclusionary rule applies to proceedings under
the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act We
reverse the judgment of the Commission
and vacate the tax and penalty assessed
against Sims.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs.
STEWART, Justice (concurring in the
result):
I concur in the result reached in Justice
Durham's opinion. I write separately because I think it essential to observe that
her sweeping opinion represents the -views
of only two justices of this Court and is
therefore not the law of the state. I also
write because her opinion raises more difficult issues than it settles with respect to
the legality of roadblocks. While I would
prefer not to address the legality of the
roadblock, I do so briefly to point out that
the result of this case is dictated by federal
law.
As Justice Durham's opinion demonstrates, the Tax Commission proceeding
that adjudicated petitioner's tax liability
under the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax
Act was quasi-criminal in nature. The primary purpose of that Act is to penalize, not
to raise revenue. In effect, the Act imposes criminal penalties for the possession of
illegal drugs.
The United States Supreme Court held in
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d
170 (1965), that the Search and Seizure
Clause of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the exclul. Justice Howe contends in his dissenting opinion that under United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 96 S.O. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), the
proceeding before the Tax Commission was not
quasi-criminal in nature. I disagree. The holding in Janis turned on the issue of whether
evidence illegally seized by state officers should
be suppressed in a federal action to assess wagering taxes. The Court held that the Fourth

sionary rule apply to quasHniminal proceedings. Because the instant case involves a quasi-criminal proceeding and because the Tax Commission concedes on appeal that the roadblock was illegal, it follows that the evidence seized as a result of
the roadblock must be suppressed under
federal law. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); see
also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83
S.Ct. 1623,10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); James v.
Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 86 S.Ct 151, 15
L.Ed.2d 30 (1965) (per curiam).1
Notwithstanding the Tax Commission's
concession that the roadblock was illegal,
Justice Durham asserts that it would be
"irresponsible" to assume the illegality of
the roadblock. She does not explain, and I
do not see, why that is so. Issues are
frequently conceded for purposes of decision. It is therefore sufficient to hold that
federal law requires suppression of the illegally seized evidence in this case. Nevertheless, Justice Durham undertakes an extensive analysis of search and seizure law
for the benefit of "the lower courts, counsel, and law enforcement officers generally." She concludes that the roadblock was
illegal under Utah constitutional law. That
conclusion, however, is dictum.
I would hold the roadblock illegal under
federal law because of the complete lack of
protection against unbridled police discretion as to how, when, under what circumstances, in what manner, and for what purpose roadblocks may be used. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990).
The authority to establish roadblocks to
stop automobiles pursuant to wholly arbitrary discretion is fundamentally contrary
to the privacy interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Amendment did not require the suppression of
illegally seized evidence in a federal proceeding
where the evidence had been seized by state, not
federal, law enforcement officers. The Court
reasoned that the exclusion of that evidence in a
federal proceeding would not serve to deter
unlawful state police conduct Id at 454, 96
S.Ct. at 3032.
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Justice Durham's reliance on, and reference to, State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460
(Utah 1990), raises difficult problems and
settles nothing. Although Larocco is cited
repeatedly, it did not represent the views of
a majority of this Court Moreover, I do
not now, and did not in Larocco, understand what Justice Durham means when
she refers to "this court's commitment to
the warrant approach under our state constitution." I agree that warrants are a
highly important element of search and
seizure law, but insofar as the "warrant
approach" is intended to be something different from the "federal approach," I do
not know what the warrant approach is,
and Larocco does not elucidate that point.
On its facts, Larocco was nothing more
than a disagreement with federal search
and seizure law on a comparatively peripheral aspect
Now, Justice Durham states that "warrantless searches of automobiles will be
allowed only if probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist" She then states that
in the case of a "suspicionless investigatory
roadblock, neither the first nor the second
prong of the warrant requirement is met"
Those statements taken together would
make all preplanned, suspicionless roadblocks illegal, including roadblocks intended to remove intoxicated drivers from the
highways or to enforce automobile safety
measures. Although at one point Justice
Durham seems to arbitrarily exempt statutorily authorized roadblocks from those
constitutional requirements, she does not
explain that point
I also disavow any conclusion that might
be drawn from Justice Durham's opinion
that the exclusionary rule should be applied
in civil cases generally, as opposed to quasi-criminal cases that are technically civil in
nature.

lation of article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution is inadmissible in a proceeding
before the Tax Commission under the Utah
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act The majority
extends the state exclusionary rule to proceedings under the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax
Act, based on the reasoning that illegally
obtained evidence should be excluded from
a civil proceeding (1) if the proceeding is in
effect criminal or (2) if the exclusion is
necessary to deter future unconstitutional
searches. In my opinion, neither of those
two reasons supports the exclusion of the
evidence in the instant case.
The state exclusionary rule came into
existence on the vote of a majority of this
court in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460
(Utah 1990) (Justice Durham wrote for the
court, Justice Zimmerman concurred, and
Justice Stewart concurred in the result).
Chief Justice Hall and this writer dissented
from the application of the rule to the facts
of that case. Subsequently, in State v.
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), this
court applied the rule to exclude bank records of a criminal defendant (Justice
Stewart dissented.) As the majority opinion in the instant case points out, the Larocco decision expressly reserved the question of the nature and scope of the exclusionary rule under the Utah Constitution,
holding only that it exists. When and under what conditions it is to be applied was
left to be determined in future cases. In
view of that reservation, I deem it very
important in the instant case that we not
extend the rule further than the reasoning
and purpose upon which it rests.

The majority opinion correctly notes that
in recent years there has been a trend in
federal courts to limit the application of the
federal exclusionary rule. See United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct 3021,
49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), for a discussion of
the criticism which has been leveled at that
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
rule by writers and jurists. Indeed, Justice
(dissenting):
Blackmun observed that the evolution of
I find it unnecessary to determine wheth- the exclusionary rule has been marked by
er the roadblock and Sims' subsequent con- sharp divisions in the Supreme Court
sent to the search were invalid. Assuming Janis, 428 U.S. at 446, 96 S.Ct at 3028, 49
that to be true, I cannot agree that evi- L.Ed.2d at 1056. I therefore believe that
dence seized from Sims' automobile in vio- we should exercise caution in extending the
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L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (discussed infra in part
II), the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule even though there had been an
intrasovereign violation. It is significant
that in Janis, the Court could have decided
the case on the ground that the civil tax
proceeding brought there to collect taxes
on illegal wagering was quasi-criminal in
nature. But it did not do so. Instead, the
Janis Court acknowledged One 1958 Plymouth Sedan in a footnote but distinguished
it on the ground that the forfeiture of
items used in the commission of a crime is
"clearly a penalty for the criminal offense." Janis, 428 U.S. at 447 n. 17, 96
S.Ct at 3029 n. 17, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1057 n.
17. The Court noted that it had "never
applied the exclusionary rule to exclude
evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or
I
state." Janis, 428 U.S. at 447, 96 S.Ct at
I cannot agree with the majority that 3029, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1057. To this day, the
civil proceedings under the Utah Illegal Supreme Court has not held that a tax
Drug Stamp Tax Act are in effect criminal collection proceeding was quasi-criminal in
and thus the exclusionary rule should ap- nature and applied the exclusionary rule
ply. The majority relies upon One 1958 under One 1958 Plymouth Sedan.
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
Forfeiture proceedings are therefore
U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 unique in their status as quasi-criminal,
(1965), where the Supreme Court applied and such status should not be extended to
the rule in a proceeding for forfeiture of an civil tax proceedings. Governments levy
article used in violation of the criminal law. taxes on a variety of legal activities as well
The Court held that the forfeiture proceed- as illegal activities. The nature of the proing was quasfcriminal in character. How- ceeding to impose taxes does not change
ever, the instant case is not a forfeiture when the activity taxed is illegal. Indeed,
proceeding, but a civil tax liability proceed- the Internal Revenue Code imposes taxes
ing before the Tax Commission. A subse- on bootlegging, gambling, extortion, and
quent case, United States v. Janis, 428 fraud. The majority attempts to draw
U.S. 433, 447, 96 S.Ct 3021, 3028-29, 49 strength for its position by referring to the
LEd.2d 1046, 1056-57 (1976) (not cited in 100 percent penalty imposed upon violators
the majority opinion), severely limited One of the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act How1958 Plymouth Sedan to its facts. The ever, although heavy penalties are customCourt held that evidence unlawfully seized arily found in federal and state tax law, no
by local police officers investigating local court has held or suggested that the impowagering offenses was not barred from sition of heavy penalties transforms a tax
use in a subsequent federal civil tax pro- collection proceeding into a quasi-criminal
ceeding. The Court left open the issue of proceeding. The taxpayer may feel that he
whether the exclusionary rule should be or she is being punished, but the exclusionapplied in a civil proceeding involving an ary rule should not be used to remedy
intrasovereign violation, i.e., where the unjust taxation. The legislature, in enactagency that effected the unlawful arrest ing the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, clearly
was responsible for instituting the subse- intended for the 100 percent penalty to be a
quent civil action. Later, in Immigration civil penalty. It is assessed and collected
and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Men- as part of the tax. The Act does, however,
doza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct 3479, 82 impose a criminal penalty in addition. A
exclusionary rule to civil cases, particularly
where it will have no deterrent effect
The majority opinion observes that only a
few state courts have explicitly considered
the question of whether their state exclusionary rule extends to civil proceedings.
Of those few courts, most have not applied
it to civil proceedings. The majority suggests that only in Oregon, where the purpose of the state exclusionary rule has
been characterized as the restoration of a
defendant's personal right rather than the
deterrence of unlawful police conduct, and
Alaska, where a state policy of "fundamental fairness" was recognized, has the rule
been invoked in civil proceedings. There is
no counterpart right or policy in Utah.
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dealer distributing or possessing drugs Sims ought to have the right to a jury trial,
without affixing the appropriate stamps is the right to counsel, and other protections
guilty of a third degree felony and is sub- afforded to an accused. Such a conclusion
ject to a fine of not more than $10,000. would be impractical and absurd.
Thus, the legislature prescribed separate
civil and criminal penalties, which distincII
tion we should observe.
The second reason offered in the majoriThe majority opinion concedes that forty opinion for applying the exclusionary
feiture proceedings are frequently cited as
the prototype of quasi-criminaLproceadings rule in this case, i.e., to deter future unlawbut states that "other kinds of civil pro- ful seizures, is misplaced. The exclusionceedings" have been characterized as qua- ary rule is a creature of federal case law.
si-criminal. However, none of the cases In that body of law, it has been consistentcited and relied upon by the majority as ly held that the exclusionary rule is "a
being quasi-criminal are civil tax proceed- judicially created remedy designed to safeings except United States v. Blank, 261 guard fourth amendment rights generally
F.Supp. 180 (N.D.Ohio 1966). Blank was through its deterrent effect, rather than a
decided years before Janis clearly limited personal constitutional right of the party
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan to forfeiture aggrieved." United States v. Janis, 428
proceedings. Thus, it is clear that Blank is U.S. 433, 446, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3028, 49
not good law in light of the subsequent L.Ed.2d 1046, 1056 (1976) (quoting United
case of Janis. The Second Circuit, in lira- States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94
do v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)).
1982), noted that "in a handful of cases" Since it is a remedy and not a right, "applidecided just after the Supreme Court's ap- cation of the rule has been restricted to
plication of the exclusionary rule to forfei- those areas where its remedial objectives
ture proceedings in One 1958 Plymouth are thought most efficaciously served."
Sedan, a few courts applied the exclusion- Id. 428 U.S. at 447, 96 S.Ct. at 3028, 49
ary rule in civil proceedings by analogy to L.Ed.2d at 1056-57 (quoting Calandra, 414
criminal proceedings. Tirado, 689 F.2d at U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 620). The exclu311 n. 5. "These cases stretched the 'qua- sionary rule is strong medicine which presi-criminal' rationale used in the forfeiture vents the enforcement of admittedly valid
cases to reach" certain civil proceedings, laws and should be taken no more often
wrote the Second Circuit. Id. Among the than is necessary to "combat the disease."
cases referred to are Blank and Powell v. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487 n. 24, 96
Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C.Cir.1966). S.Ct. 3037, 3049 n. 24, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 n.
Those two cases and Iowa v. Union As- 24, 1083-84 n. 24 (1976) (quoting Amsterphalt and Road Oils, Inc., 281 F.Supp. 391 dam, Search, Seizure, and section 2255: A
(S.D.Iowa 1968), which are all relied upon Comment, 112 U.Pa.L.Rev. 378, 388-89
in the majority opinion, were decided after (1964)); see also Janis, 428 U.S. at 447,
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan but before its 454, 96 S.Ct at 3028-29, 3032, 49 L.Ed.2d
application was severely limited by Janis. at 1056-57, lOBO^r -~T*e pllttie, if not the
Thus, their value as precedent is questiona- sole, purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
ble.
"deter future unlawful police conduct."
Janis,
428 U.S. at 446, 96 S.Ct. at 3028, 49
The reasoning of the majority is that this
L.Ed.2d
at 1056 (quoting Calandra, 414
tax proceeding is quasi-criminal and that
U.S.
at
347,
94 S.Ct. at 619). Indeed, one
Sims should be accorded the benefit of the
reason
the
exclusionary
rule is generally
exclusionary rule, which was developed to
not
applicable
in
civil
cases
is that the
be applied in criminal cases. Perhaps,
parties
.to
the
action
did
not
control the
then, other rights accorded a criminal desearch
and
application
of
the
rule would
fendant should be extended to Sims as well.
not
discourage
the
parties
from
searching
The Tax Commission would then be transunlawfully.
formed into a criminal tribunal under which
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The Supreme Court in Janis outlined a
framework for deciding the type of proceeding in which application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate. 428 U.S. at
448-54, 96 S.Ct at 3029-82, 49 L.Ed.2d at
1057-61. The Court stated that the likely
social benefits of excluding unlawfully
seized evidence should be weighed against
the likely costs. On the benefit side of the
balance, the prime purpose of the rule is to
deter future unlawful police conduct On
the cost side, there is the loss of often
probative evidence, which may result in a
wrongdoer's going unpunished. Subsequently, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032, 104 S.Ct 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984),
the Court summarized why it had refused
to apply the exclusionary rule in Janis,
which was a civil proceeding to impose and
collect taxes on illegal bookmaking:
Two factors in Janis suggested that the
deterrence value of the exclusionary rule
in the context of that case was slight.
First, the state law enforcement officials
were already "punished" by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal
trial as a result of the same conduct
Second, the evidence was also excludable
in any federal criminal trial that might
be held. Both factors suggested that
further application of the exclusionary
rule in the federal civil proceeding would
contribute little more to the deterrence
of unlawful conduct by state officials.
On the cost side of the balance, Janis
focused simply on the loss of "concededly relevant and reliable evidence." The
Court concluded that, on balance, this
cost outweighed the likely social benefits
achievable through application of the exclusionary rule in the federal civil proceeding.
Id 468 U.S. at 1042, 104 S.Ct. at 3485, 82
L.Ed.2d at 788 (quoting Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 447-48, 96 S.Ct at 3029).
In refusing to apply the exclusionary
rule in the tax proceedings in Janis, the
Court properly noted:
There comes a point at which courts,
consistent with their duty to administer
the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of

a supervisory role that is properly the
duty of the Executive and Legislative
branches.
Janis, 428 U.S. at 459, 96 S.Ct at 3034, 49
L.Ed.2d at 1064.
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court declined to
apply the exclusionary rule in a civil deportation hearing where an alien admitted his
unlawful presence in this country after an
allegedly unlawful arrest by INS agents,
making it an intrasovereign violation. Nevertheless, the Court held that "the Jams
balance between costs and benefits comes
out against applying the exclusionary rule
in civil deportation hearings held by the
INS." Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050,
104 S.Ct. at 3489, 82 L.Ed.2d at 793. It
was observed that the INS had "already
taken sensible and reasonable steps to deter Fourth Amendment violations by its
officers," making the likely additional deterrent value of the exclusionary rule
srna)). Id
"The costs of applying the
exclusionary rule in the context of civil
deportation hearings are high," the Court
noted, because the courts would be compelled to release from custody persons who
would then immediately resume their commission of a crime through their continuing
unlawful presence in this country. Id
In a case decided after Janis, the Second
Circuit held in Tirado v. Commissioner,
689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.1982), that evidence
allegedly seized unlawfully by federal narcotics agents for use in a narcotics prosecution was not barred by the exclusionary
rule in a subsequent federal civil tax proceeding by the IRS. The court concluded
that the deterrent value of the exclusionary
rule would not be served by applying the
rule to exclude evidence from a proceeding
where the evidence was not seized with the
participation or collusion of, or in contemplation of use by, the IRS agents responsible for the proceeding in which the evidence is presented. Id, at 315. The court
noted that the exclusionary rule "is calculated to prevent, not to repair," and that it
should not be applied in cases where there
is only a remote prospect of deterrence.
Id at 310 (citing Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct 1437, 1444, 4
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L.E&2d 1669 (I960)). "Since use of the
exclusionary rule impairs the search for
truth even as it aids observance of constitut e rial limitations, standards for use of the
rule must balance public needs against the
claims of individual liberty." Id. at 310.
In refusing to apply the exclusionary rule
in the tax deficiency proceedings brought
against the defendant by the IRS, the court
stated that the deterrent purpose of the
rule would not be served by suppressing
the seized evidence that formed the basis
of the tax deficiency notice. Said the
court:
Tax deficiency proceedings are too remote from the "zone of primary interest"
of the narcotics agents who made the
seizures in Tirado's apartment. As in
Janis, it is not reasonable to suppose
that a rule barring use of the evidence in
a civil tax proceeding would have materially influenced those agents in their decision whether to make the particular seizures
Nor would agents of the
Drug Enforcement Agency be likely to
harbor a general motivating interest in
assisting the enforcement of civil tax obligations.
Id. at 314.
As is pointed out in footnote 1 in the
majority opinion, Sims was charged with
the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value.
The trial court convicted him, but the court
of appeals overturned that conviction after
determining that evidence of the drugs
seized from his automobile should have
been suppressed. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d
141 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Thus, a healthy
dose of deterrent has already been administered to the officers participating in the
roadblock. To administer a further dose to
the Tax Commission is quite unfounded.
The Tax Commission is charged by the
Utah Constitution with administering the
tax laws of this state. Neither the Commission nor any of its officers or employees
originated or participated in any way in the
roadblock. Application of the exclusionary
rule in this case will not serve any deter-

rent purpose since the Commission, its of ficers, and its employees are blameless in
any violation there may have been of Sims'
constitutional rights. Like the officers
who illegally seized evidence in Janis, in
Lopez-Mendoza, and in Tirado, the officers here, who were members of the Juab
County Sheriffs force and members of the
Utah Highway Patrol, did not have in mind
aiding or assisting the Tax Commission in
collecting taxes when they set up the roadblock which resulted in Sims' apprehension.
That thought was not in their "zone of
primary interests." Unless the exclusionary rule under our state constitution is to
be applied blindly in every case where
there is a violation, it has no place in the
instant case, where no deterrent effect will
be felt.
Recently the Supreme Court of Iowa, in
Westendorfv. Iowa Department of Transportation, 400 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1987),
refused to impose the exclusionary rule in
a driver's license revocation proceeding because it "would have little force as a deterrent of unlawful police action because the
[driver's license] department does not control the actions of local police officers."
Id. at 557. That court, relying upon the
Supreme Court's decisions in Janis and in
Lopez-Mendoza, applied a balancing test.1
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Delguidice v. New Jersey Raxing
Commission, 100 NJ. 79, 494 A.2d 1007
(1985), held that a finding of entrapment
and the resulting dismissal of criminal proceedings against a jockey did not prevent
use of the incriminating evidence in the
jockey's licensing hearing before the racing
commission. The balancing test of Janis
and Lopez-Mendoza was employed. Because the illegally obtained evidence had
been suppressed in the criminal proceedings, the desired deterrent had already
been realized, and extending the exclusionary sanction to the subsequent licensing
proceeding would have no deterrent effect

1. Subsequently, the Iowa legislature enacted a
statute that extended the exclusionary rule to
driver's license revocation proceedings. See

Brownsberger v. Department of Transp., Motor
Vehicle Div., 460 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1990).

There are significant parallels in the
Iowa case, the New Jersey case, and the
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instant case, First, in all three cases, the
subsequent civil proceedings arose out of
the same incidents as the criminal proceedings. In the criminal proceedings, the evidence was suppressed. Second, in the subsequent civil proceedings, the defendants
were faced with heavy consequences.
Sims faces a substantial tax and penalty.
In the Iowa case, the defendant faced the
loss of his driver's license, which usually is
a more severe consequence than a short jail
term or a fine imposed for driving under
the influence. In the New Jersey case, the
jockey faced the loss of his license that
enabled him to earn his living. In all three
cases, the tax commission, the driver's license department, and the racing commission, respectively, did not direct, authorize,
or in any way control the officers' actions.
Consequently, application of the exclusionary rule in the civil proceeding would serve
Ho purpose.
The majority opinion does not conduct
any kind of a balancing test to determine
Whether application of the exclusionary
rule is appropriate in this case. No mention is even made of the high cost of invoking the rule, viz., Sims escapes criminal
conviction and all tax and penalties. Indeed, the only justification offered is that
law enforcement entities have a "financial
motivation" for conducting illegal searches
since Utah law provides that resulting revenue will be shared with the agency conducting the search. Utah Code Ann. § 5 9 19-105(6). However, the majority concedes
that this provision did not become effectiveUntil nine months after the search of Sims'
automobile. Therefore, it is clear that in
the instant case, no part of the tax or
Penalty imposed on Sims will find its way
hack to Juab County, where the roadblock
occurred. The officers here did not act
under any financial incentive.
In summary, the majority, in applying
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, goes further than any case of the
United States Supreme Court in enforcing
Fourth Amendment rights. The majority
Pushes the exclusionary rule into the area
°f civil tax law, where few courts, if any,
federal or state, have ever trod. The majority applies the exclusionary rule as if it

were a constitutional right and completely
overlooks the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in the overturning of Sims'
criminal conviction. Applying the rule
against the Tax Commission will serve no
deterrent purpose.
I would affirm the decision of the Commission.
HALL, CJ., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of HOWE, Associate CJ.
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Defendant was convicted in the Fourth
District Court, Utah County, Ray M. Harding, J., of distributing or arranging to
distribute cocaine. Defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that
(1) .findings regarding wiretap order adequately supported denial of suppression
motion, even though findings did not specifically address each objection by defendant; (2) interception of defendant's telephone conversations complied with wiretap
order; and (3) evidence supported conviction.
Affirmed.
1. Telecommunications «=»514
County attorney's documents specifically authorizing deputy county attorney to
apply for wiretap order satisfied federal
statute authorizing principal prosecuting
attorney of political subdivision to apply

